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CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 
OF PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS 
KIMBERLY J. JENKINS* 
ABSTRACT 
Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools are 
making a comeback. School districts are structuring these 
schools in a variety of ways, including by providing a single-sex 
public school for only one sex or by offering single-sex schools for 
both sexes. These disparate structures of single-sex schools 
create distinct potential harms, risks, and benefits for students. 
This Article contends that the constitutional framework applied 
to single-sex schools should be systematically modified to 
recognize the different potential harms, risks, and benefits of 
these single-sex schools in a manner that will create optimal 
conditions for creating single-sex public schools. The proposed 
modifications address the shortcomings of other scholarly 
proposals and minimize the current indeterminacy in the 
constitutional case law that could create unnecessary barriers 
to the development of single-sex public schools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public single-sex elementary and secondary schools are experi-
encing a renaissance that appears likely to continue in the coming 
years, given the anticipated increased flexibility in the federal laws 
that regulate such schools.1 The U.S. Department of Education's 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is scheduled to release new regulations 
that provide additional flexibility under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX)2 for public single-sex schools and 
classrooms.3 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 permits local 
educational agencies to use some funds to support single-sex 
schools and classrooms consistent with applicable law.4 In 1995, 
only three public high schools had all-female student bodies.5 For 
1. See Martha Minow, Remarks, Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (And 
Single-Sex Education): In Honor of Linda McClain, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 817 (2005) 
(noting the 2004 publication of the Office for Civil Rights' proposed changes to federal 
regulations that govern single-sex schools and that "by publishing the proposed rule, the 
federal government has clearly signaled a green light for experiments"); Denise C. Morgan, 
Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality 
ofK-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381,389 ("[I)n recent years there has 
been a resurgence of interest in single-sex schooling-particularly on the K-12 level."); Tal 
Barak, Number of Single-Sex Schools Growing: N.Y. C. -Based Network Opens Schools for Girls 
in Urban Districts, Eouc. WK (Bethesda, Md.), Oct. 20, 2004, at 33 (discussing the recent 
growth in single-sex public education and noting that "the interest in single-sex education 
stems from a friendlier climate in Washington under the Bush administration"); Jane Gross, 
Dividing the Sexes, for the Tough Years: A Coed School Offers Boys and Girls Separate Classes 
in Grades 6-8, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at B1 (discussing the proposed amendments to 
federal law on single-sex public schools that would encourage development of these schools); 
Todd Silberman, Girls Charter School Would Be N.C.'s First; Raleigh Backers Follow National 
Trend, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 14, 2004, at A1 (discussing how the number 
of single-sex schools and classes could rise significantly because of proposed changes to the 
federal law that regulates single-sex public education). 
2. Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any program or activity that 
receives federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
3. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
4. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(a}(23), 115 Stat. 1425, 
1782 (2001) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301) (providing that innovative program funds may 
be used for "[p)rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms (consistent with 
applicable law}"). 
5. See Nat'! Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Public Schools in the United 
States, http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter 
NASSPE, Schools). The three public single-sex high schools in 1995 were Western High 
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the 2005-06 school year, the National Association for Public Single-
Sex Education (NASSPE) reports that forty-four public elementary 
and secondary schools in the United States are single-sex and that 
thirteen of these schools opened or became single-sex in the 2005-06 
school year.6 In light of these developments and growing public 
demand for single-sex public schools, educators and scholars are 
focusing increased attention on this educational option. 7 
The emergence of a new generation of public single-sex elemen-
tary and secondary schools raises several novel constitutional 
questions because some of these schools have unique characteristics 
that distinguish them from other types of sex8 classifications, 
including the potential for voluntary decisions by students (or their 
parents) to be classified based on sex-by attending the school-and 
the provision by some schools or districts of similar educational 
opportunities to both sexes. When looking for answers to these 
constitutional questions, educators and courts will find mixed 
signals in the Supreme Court's case law on sex classifications, 
including its two single-sex public education cases, both of which 
involved postsecondary schools. 9 On the one hand, in United 
School in Baltimore, Maryland, Philadelphia High School for Girls, and Spectrum High 
Schools for Girls in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. NASSPE defines a single-sex school as a school 
"in which all grades offer ONLY single-sex classes" and excludes correctional schools. Id. 
6. See id. 
7. See Minow, supra note 1, at 830-31 ("With clear encouragement at the federal level 
and strong interests in the states, I predict that distinctive educational programs for girls and 
single-sex educational settings will be expanding."); Ashley E. Johnson, Note, Single-Sex 
Classes in Public Secondary Schools: Maximizing the Value of a Public Education for the 
Nation's Students, 57 V AND. L. REv. 629, 665 (2004) ("Increasing public interest in single-sex 
schools further reflects their positive reputation."); Alexa Aguilar, School District Finds 
Success with Single-Sex Classrooms, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2005, at B1 
(discussing the "growing number of public schools nationwide that are moving to single-sex 
schools or offering single-sex classes within a coed school"). 
8. Although many distinctions can be drawn between sex and gender, the terms are used 
interchangeably in this Article. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of 
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 
(1995) (discussing the differences between the terms and noting "[s]ex is regarded as a 
product of nature, while gender is understood as a function of culture. This disaggregation of 
sex from gender represents a central mistake of equality jurisprudence"). 
9. Additionally, in 1977, the Supreme Court affirmed a Third Circuit opinion that found 
two comparable single-sex public high schools constitutional. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. 
of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided court per curiam, 430 
u.s. 703 (1977). 
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States v. Virginia 10 and Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan/ 1 the Court held, respectively, that the single-sex admis-
sions policies at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and the 
Mississippi University for Women (MUW) were unconstitutional 
under intermediate scrutiny, which requires a sex classification to 
be substantially related to an important governmental interest.12 
The Court held in both cases that the State failed to demonstrate a 
substantial relationship between the State's purported objective and 
the single-sex admissions policy.13 On the other hand, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court in Virginia, went so far as to state 
that the Court did "not question the Commonwealth's prerogative 
evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities" in 
response to arguments from amici that single-sex schools can 
increase the variety of educational options.14 
While the Court did not question the State's prerogative to 
support diverse educational opportunities in an evenhanded 
manner, the rigor with which intermediate scrutiny was applied in 
Virginia prompted many to suggest that intermediate scrutiny is 
becoming increasingly indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.15 In 
fact, Justice Scalia found the Court's scrutiny to be so exacting that 
he proclaimed single-sex education "functionally dead."16 While 
10. 518 u.s. 515 (1996). 
11. 458 u.s. 718 (1982). 
12. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. 
13. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730. 
14. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n. 7 (emphasis added). The Court in both Virginia and Hogan 
explicitly noted that the facts before it involved a unique single-sex institution that existed 
for only one sex, as opposed to similar single-sex institutions for each sex. See id.; Hogan, 458 
U.S. at 720 n.l. 
15. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(" And the rationale oftoday's 
decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that 
makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny."); Low-Income Women of Tex. v. Bost, 38 
S.W.3d 689, 705 (Tex. App. 2000) (Yeakel, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court possibly 
heightened the federal review standard somewhat in United States v. Virginia .... "), rev'd sub 
nom. Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75 
(1996) ("The Court [in Virginia) did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but 
pressed it closer to strict scrutiny."). But see David K Bowsher, Note, Cracking the Code of 
United States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J. 305, 338 (1998) ("[T]he MESSAGE of United States 
v. Virginia is the same as the MESSAGES of the Court's earlier gender-based equal protection 
cases: gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny."). 
16. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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some have agreed with Justice Scalia and have contended that 
public single-sex schools are not likely io survive constitutional 
scrutiny after Virginia, 17 others have argued that ample room 
remains under the Constitution for such schools to exist and even 
thrive. 18 Because new single-sex public schools open each year, the 
contentious debate continues today over the constitutionality of 
single-sex public elementary and secondary schools. 19 
Attempting to provide some answers to the constitutional 
questions surrounding public single-sex schools, scholars have 
principally turned to two theories of gender equity to address how 
courts would or should apply intermediate scrutiny to these schools: 
formal equality and antisubordination. Formal equality determines 
the constitutionality of single-sex schools by examining whether 
girls and boys are provided substantially equal opportunities.20 In 
17. See, e.g., ROSEMARY C. SAWMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX 
SCHOOUNG 2 (2003) (noting that the National Organization for Women and the New York 
Civil Liberties Union "questioned how any publicly supported single-sex school could possibly 
survive the Court's recent decision in the VMI case"); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a 
Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 
DUKE L.J. 753, 813 (2000) ("While same-sex schooling has not been found per se 
unconstitutional, the Court's rulings suggest that it will be difficult indeed for such 
educational policies to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause."); Valorie K Vojdik, 
Girls' Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL 'y 69, 96 
(1997) ("While VMI does not per se prohibit public girls' schools, it is nevertheless doubtful 
that New York school officials will be able to demonstrate that public schools for girls serve 
an 'exceedingly persuasive justification."'). 
18. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 1, at 383 ("Nor is there any reason to believe the 
'exceedingly persuasive justification' language in Virginia necessarily spells the end of the 
new generation of single-sex public schools."); Cass Sunstein notes that 
Virginia certainly does not invalidate the state's decision to separate men and 
women in the interest of ensuring equal opportunity .... If the state reached its 
decision deliberatively and without infection from stereotypes about gender 
roles, and the decision promoted rather than undermined equal opportunity, the 
Court might uphold the program. 
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76; see also MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POUCY AND THE 
LAw 571 (4th ed. 2002) ("Various commentators concluded that the decision sounded the 
death knell for single-sex education, but others countered that school districts could provide 
such programs so long as they offered a sufficiently compelling justification."). 
19. See Minow, supra note 1, at 816 ("The topic of some urgency is single-sex education 
in kindergarten through high school, not college-level education."); Morgan, supra note 1, at 
458 ("Rather than resolving the quandary, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Virginia left important questions unanswered."); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76 ("The Court 
did not decide a number of future questions about same-sex programs .... "). 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 261-65. 
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contrast, antisubordination focuses on whether the single-sex 
opportunities harm or perpetuate the inferiority of girls and 
women. 21 This Article explains why these theories, as currently 
formulated, should not be adopted as the sole theoretical guideposts 
for applying intermediate scrutiny to single-sex public elementary 
and secondary schools. 
This Article then proposes a modification and systematization of 
intermediate scrutiny that, on balance, will achieve results superior 
to the Court's current intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence and 
these scholarly approaches. The new generation of single-sex public 
schools may benefit some students and create pitfalls for others.22 
The optimal constitutional standard applied to these schools should 
allow educators, parents, and schoolchildren to harvest the benefits 
while avoiding or minimizing the pitfalls. The new approach 
outlined in this Article for assessing the constitutionality of single-
sex schools seeks to achieve the appropriate balance between the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of single-sex public schools. 
It works within the existing intermediate scrutiny framework and 
case law when doing so would achieve the best possible results. 
However, this Article also proposes that the Court modify and 
systematize intermediate scrutiny when the current framework 
would result in adverse outcomes or where the Court has yet to 
explore the constitutional ramifications of single-sex public schools. 
At the heart of this Article's approach is the contention that two 
factors determine the nature of the potential harm presented by 
single-sex public schools: (1) voluntary attendance at the schools 
and (2) the provision of substantially equal single-sex schools for 
each sex. Analysis of these two factors results in dividing single-sex 
public schools into two categories that present distinct potential 
harms: (1) dual, voluntary schools, in which each sex may attend 
substantially equal schools, and students attend the schools 
voluntarily; or (2) solitary or involuntary schools, in which one sex 
is provided with a single-sex school that the other sex is not 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86. 
22. See Leonard Sax, The Promise and Peril of Single-Sex Public Education: Mr. Chips 
Meets Snoop Dogg, Enuc. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Mar. 2, 2005, at 48 (describing the success of 
some single-sex schools and the problems encountered by others). 
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provided, or in which students attend a single-sex school involun-
tarily. 
Traditionally, to apply intermediate scrutiny to single-sex schools, 
a district would have to show that its single-sex admissions policy 
serves an important govemmental interest and that the policy is 
substantially related to the achievement of that interest.23 However, 
the Court has applied the substantial relationship component of 
intermediate scrutiny in an inconsistent manner, sometimes 
requiring a very tight fit between means and ends and sometimes 
permitting a rather loose fit. 24 The variety of possible interpreta-
tions of intermediate scrutiny could have a detrimental impact on 
the development of single-sex public schools because courts could 
unnecessarily constrain educators' options for developing innovative 
single-sex programs, or courts might fail to require adequate 
safeguards to protect schoolchildren from the potential adverse 
effects of single-sex schools. In addition, the uncertainty in the 
constitutional standard could chill the opening of such schools by 
educators who fear the risk oflitigation. The proposal in this Article 
seeks to avoid these adverse results by systematizing how voluntary 
attendance and the provision of substantially equal benefits should 
modify the substantial relationship component of intermediate 
scrutiny. 
The identification of and focus on these two factors for assessing 
whether single-sex schools have a substantial relationship to their 
important objective mirrors the Court's systematization of strict 
scrutiny in United States v. Paradise, in which the Court identified 
the key factors that determine whether a program is narrowly 
tailored to achieve its compelling governmental interest. 25 By 
applying disparate interpretations of intermediate scrutiny 
depending on the potential harms of single-sex schools, this Article's 
approach builds on the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.26 As discussed briefly below, in Grutter, the Court 
modified its past requirements for strict scrutiny so that the 
23. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
24. See infra Part II.A-B. 
25. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (noting that when the Court 
determines if a program is narrowly tailored the Court examines "several factors"). 
26. 539 u.s. 306 (2003). 
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standard recognized the unique characteristics of the University of 
Michigan Law School's admissions policy, distinguishing it from 
other racial classifications.27 Similarly, this Article acknowledges 
that the distinct characteristics of some single-sex schools neither 
present the same potential harm nor should be subject to the same 
constitutional hurdles as some of the sex classifications that the 
Court has considered in the past. 
This Article develops its proposal in five parts. Part LA briefly 
examines the causes of the recent resurgence in single-sex public 
elementary and secondary schools, including the search for effective 
alternatives to address the needs of girls and boys and the proposed 
increased flexibility for such schools under Title IX. Part I.B 
considers the objectives of single-sex schools and includes a short 
overview of the literature regarding the possible benefits of single-
sex schools, and Part I.C describes the success of some modem day 
single-sex public schools. Part I.C concludes with a recognition that 
single-sex schools may present potential harms, as evidenced by 
concerns that have arisen in more recent single-sex public schools 
and the history of single-sex schools in the United States. 
Part II considers the Supreme Court's disparate interpretations 
of intermediate scrutiny, explaining how intermediate scrutiny's 
indeterminacy renders it ineffective as a constitutional standard for 
single-sex schools. Part III presents the two existing theories that 
dominate the scholarship on single-sex schools and argues that 
these theories alone should not be adopted. Part IV's analysis of 
Grutter v. Bollinger sets the stage for this Article's proposal by 
analyzing how the Court revised the requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause to address the particular circumstances of the 
state action before the Court. Part IV also identifies the two unique 
characteristics of some public single-sex schools that support 
modification of the existing constitutional framework. Part IV then 
proposes how intermediate scrutiny should be applied to dual, 
voluntary single-sex schools and to solitary or involuntary single-sex 
schools. Part V presents some concluding thoughts and explains 
some of the benefits of adopting this proposal, including a discussion 
27. See infra Part IV.A. 
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of how the proposal, if adopted, would systematize and clarify 
intermediate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools.28 
I. THE RENAISSANCE OF PuBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
A. Why Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Schools Are 
Reemerging in the United States 
In the 1990s, educators and researchers began focusing on public 
single-sex education as one possible avenue to address gender 
equity concerns in coeducational schools, even though single-sex 
public schools were virtually extinct in the United States by the late 
1980s. 29 Gender bias within coeducational schools was uncovered 
and highlighted beginning in the late 1970s, initially focusing on the 
bias that girls faced in K-12 coeducational settings. 30 These concerns 
included findings that in coeducational schools, particular subjects 
became identified with one gender; for example, English and foreign 
languages were considered feminine or "girl subjects," while science 
28. This Article does not separately address the racial implications of developing single-
sex schools, particularly within urban areas. For articles addressing these issues, see, for 
example, Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses 
to the "Crisis" Facing African-American Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 63 (1994); Verna L. 
Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and 
Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 15. 
29. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 70-71; Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard,Introduction 
to GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL 
SCHOOLING 3 (Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard eds., 2002) [hereinafter GENDER IN POLICY 
AND PRACTICE) ("Public schools in at least fifteen U.S. states have recently responded to calls 
for the improvement of education more generally, or to gender equity concerns, through 
experiments with single-sex education, most often in the form of separate math or science 
classes for girls."); Whitney Ransome & Meg Milne Moulton, Why Girls' Schools? The 
Difference in Girl-Centered Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 589, 589-90 (2001) (discussing 
a revived interest in single-sex education in the 1990s); NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5 
(listing single-sex public schools within the United States and listing only two such schools 
in existence by the late 1980s). 
30. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 70-71 (discussing studies on gender bias in the 
classroom from the late 1970s and 1980s); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 2-3 (noting 
that "many studies over the past twenty-five years have documented gender bias against 
females in coeducational classrooms both at the K-12 and higher education levels"); Ransome 
& Moulton, supra note 29, at 591 (noting that the "'chilly classroom climates' that permeated 
co-educational institutions were almost non-existent in girls' schools" (footnote omitted)). 
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and math were seen as masculine or "boy subjects. "31 Research also 
indicated that girls did not feel as comfortable speaking in class as 
boys did and that they received less attention than boys.32 In 
addition, starting in the middle school years, teachers gave boys 
more feedback, and "boys were more confident in learning math and 
science and perceived these subjects to be more useful."33 For 
example, a 1992 study by the American Association of University 
Women (AAUW) entitled How Schools Shortchange Girls revealed 
disconcerting findings on girls in coeducational schools, including 
the finding that girls "often are not expected or encouraged to 
pursue higher-level mathematics and science courses. "34 
A 1999 report by the AAUW entitled Gender Gaps: Where Schools 
Still Fail Our Children further documented the complexity of 
gender equity concerns in the classroom.35 The report indicated that 
the practice of tracking students affects the course-taking patterns 
of girls and boys in different ways: 
Girls are more likely than boys to have their abilities overlooked 
in math and science-a pattern that limits their future opportu-
nities. On the other hand, girls are also more likely than boys to 
be identified at a young age for gifted programs. However, girls 
fall off this gifted track at a higher rate than boys, particularly 
once they reach high school. There, peer pressure tells many 
girls to hide their intelligence and be quiet.36 
Others have echoed the AAUW's much-publicized findings on the 
negative treatment that girls experience in school. For example, 
some have contended that adverse treatment in the classroom 
discourages girls from speaking during the class discussions, 
adversely affects their self-confidence, and discourages them from 
pursuing careers in subjects such as math and science.37 Two 
31. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71. 
32. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3 ("Females have historically received less 
attention than boys [and] feel less comfortable speaking out in class .... "). 
33. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71. 
34. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, HOW SCHOOL'l SHORTCHANGE GIRLS 14 7 (1992). 
35. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GENDER GAPS: WHERE SCHOOLS STILL FAIL OUR 
CHILDREN 61 (1998). 
36. ld. at 30. 
37. See Vojdik, supra note 17, at 86; Beth Willinger, Single Gender Education and the 
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experts on the disparate treatment of girls in the classroom, David 
and Myra Sadker, describe this phenomenon in their book entitled 
Failing at Fairness: How America's Schools Cheat Girls, in which 
they contend that "[t]eachers interact with males more frequently, 
ask them better questions, and give them more precise and helpful 
feedback. Over the course of years the uneven distribution of 
teacher time, energy, attention, and talent, with boys getting the 
lion's share, takes its toll on girls."38 The Sadkers maintain that this 
disparate treatment may result not only in the "loss of self-esteem," 
but also in lower achievement and the elimination of professional 
options.39 In addition, research indicates that girls experience more 
harassment in schools, including sexual harassment.40 These and 
other factors have led educators and researchers to conclude, within 
the past couple of decades, that factors within and outside of schools 
negatively influenced the attitudes, achievement, course enrollment, 
and career choices of girls in coeducational schools.41 
While concerns about gender equity in schools have often focused 
on girls, many have contended more recently that how boys fare is 
the real problem, and some have challenged the research on harm 
to girls.42 For example, in her 2000 book entitled The War Against 
Boys: How Misguided Feminism Is Harming Our Young Men, 
Christina Hoff Sommers explains how boys lag substantially behind 
girls in reading and writing, and she contends that "it is boys, not 
girls, who are languishing academically" on a variety of measures, 
including lower educational aspirations, lower grades, and less 
Constitution, 40 LOY. L. REV. 253, 275 (1994) (noting that evidence exists that teachers 
discriminate against girls in math and science classes). 
38. MYRASADKER& DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT 
GIRLS 1 (1994). 
39. Id. 
40. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 35, at 85 (finding that eighty-five percent 
of girls and seventy-six percent of boys had experienced sexual harassment); MICHAEL GURIAN 
ET AL., BOYS AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY! 55 (2001); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, 
at3. 
41. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71. 
42. See GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 63-66; SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4; Datnow 
& Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3; Ann Hulbert, Boy Problems: The Real Gender Crisis in 
Education Starts with theY Chromosome, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, (Magazine), at 13, 13-14 
(discussing the fact that girls outperform boys in verbal test scores, college enrollment, and 
degrees earned). 
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rigorous academic programs.43 Sommers and others have also 
challenged the Sadkers' research and some of the AAUW research 
as being intentionally biased against boys, having "factual errors," 
and being motivated by a strategy to secure benefits for females.44 
Other research echoes Sommers's concerns about boys, such as 
their lower language and reading scores, their higher referral rates 
to special education, and their greater likelihood to be involved in 
violent crime and drug and alcohol use.45 For instance, Judith 
Kleinfeld contends that girls are generally thriving in education and 
boys are the ones experiencing harmful treatment in the classroom 
and adverse educational outcomes.46 A 2005 report by a group of 
Duke University researchers examines a number of indicators of 
well-being, including educational attainment, material wealth, and 
material/spiritual well-being, finding that the well-being of girls 
and boys tracked fairly closely, with girls showing advantages in 
more indicators than boys.47 The report concludes that girls are 
not disadvantaged in their educational attainment; instead, "[i]f 
anything, it is boys who are falling behind, particularly at the 
higher levels of education. "48 Others have also noted a recent surge 
in studies and research that reveals "greater gender bias ... against 
boys" in educational settings. 49 
The totality of the research suggests that in recent decades both 
sexes have experienced discrimination, undesirable educational 
outcomes, and stereotyping in distinct ways. 5° Furthermore, current 
43. CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS: HOW MISGUIDED FEMINISM Is 
HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN 14, 24 (2000). 
44. See GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 63-66; JUDITH KLEINFELD, THE MYTH THAT 
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF DECEPl'ION 1-2 (1998); 
SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 22-23. 
45. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3; Hulbert, supra note 42, at 13-14 
(discussing the recent focus of educators on the educational problems plaguing boys); 
Cornelius Riordan, Gender Gap Trends in Public Secondary Schools: 1972 to 1992, at 2 (Aug. 
21, 1998) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological 
Association in August 1998). 
46. See KLEINFELD, supra note 44, at 3. 
47. See Sara 0. Meadows et al., Assessing Gilligan v. Sommers: Gender Specific Trends 
in Child and Youth Well-Being in the United States, 1985-2001, 70 Soc. INDICATORS REs. 1, 
44 (2005) (noting that the study does not track indicators such as self-esteem). 
48. See id. at 44. 
49. GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 54 (emphasis omitted). 
50. See id. at 54-57 (summarizing research on specific areas in which both girls and boys 
experience advantages and disadvantages in education); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, 
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achievement data reveal a complex picture in which neither sex 
consistently outperforms the other. Instead, "[r]ecent reports have 
now confirmed that both boys and girls are on the unfavorable side 
of the gender gap in education and developmental matters. "51 In 
November 2004, the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) released a report that compiles a "wide range of published 
and unpublished statistical materials" on academic outcome 
measures disaggregated by sex.52 The NCES summarizes this data 
as revealing that 
in elementary and secondary school and in college, females are 
now doing as well as or better than males on many indicators of 
achievement and educational attainment, and ... large gaps that 
once existed between males and females have been eliminated 
in most cases and have significantly decreased in other cases. 53 
The report provides the most recent comprehensive examination of 
instances in which girls outperform boys, instances in which boys 
continue to outperform girls, and situations in which performance 
outcomes may be similar or may fluctuate depending on grade and 
assessment year. For example, boys scored higher than girls on 
geography, calculus, and science exams.54 While both elementary 
and secondary school girls and boys use computers to the same 
extent, boys constitute eighty-six percent of the students who took 
the Advanced Placement computer science exam, and their average 
test scores were higher than the average scores for girls. 55 However, 
"[a]lthough there is a common perception that males consistently 
outperform females in mathematics, [National Assessment of 
Education Progress] mathematics scores have not shown this .... In 
at 3 ("Gender bias is now seen as affecting both girls and boys, because neither group is 
immune to societal pressures and expectations."). 
51. Cornelius Riordan, What Do We Know About the Effects of Single-Sex Schools in the 
Private Sector?: Implications for Public Schools, in GENDER IN POUCY AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 29, at 10, 27; see NANCY S. COLE, EDUC. TESTING SERV., THE ETS GENDER STUDY: How 
FEMALES AND MALES PERFORM IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 10 (1997) (discussing studies that 
reveal that gender differences in performance cut both ways). 
52. See CATHERINE E. FREEMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'r OF EDUC., 
TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY OF GIRLS AND WOMEN: 2004, at 1 (2004). 
53. Id. 
54. See id. at 6, 32. 
55. See id. at 7-8. 
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mathematics, the gap between average scale scores has been quite 
small and fluctuated only slightly between 1990 and 2003."56 The 
disparities in science achievement varied depending on grade level 
and across time,57 and the remaining gender gaps in science are 
shrinking. 58 Research also reveals that more males score among the 
highest and lowest scores on standardized tests and that this 
pattern increases with age.59 Girls and boys also have similar 
abilities and behavior patterns on a variety of other measures.60 
Girls also outperform boys, or achieve more favorable outcomes 
than boys, on many measures. For instance, girls consistently 
outscore boys in reading and writing assessments at the fourth-, 
eighth-, and twelfth-grade levels, and they have done so since the 
early 1990s.61 Other research indicates that girls consistently 
receive higher grades than boys.62 The NCES report reveals that 
girls repeat a grade at lower rates than boys63 and are less likely to 
drop out of school. 64 Elementary school girls are less likely than boys 
to be identified as having a learning disability, emotional distur-
bance, or a speech impediment. 65 Boys also are more likely to engage 
in violent behavior while on school property66 and to engage in risky 
behavior, such as alcohol or other drug use.67 These disparities in 
conduct may be important later in life because "[d]own the road, 
there is evidence that poorer 'noncognitive skills' (not academic 
56. Id. at 6. 
57. See id. at 30. 
58. See id. at 7. 
59. See COLE, supra note 51, at 18. 
60. See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term 
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 451,471 (1999); see also FREEMAN, 
supra note 52, at 32 (discussing data that reveal that no differences existed between the sexes 
in U.S. history scores). 
61. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 28; Thomas Newkirk, The Quiet Crisis in Boys' 
Literacy, Eouc. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Sept. 10, 2003, at 34 (discussing how boys lag 
substantially behind girls in reading and writing). 
62. See COLE, supra note 51, at 18; Levit, supra note 60, at 472; Christina A. Samuels, 
Report: Boys' and Girls' 'Well-Being' Tracks Closely, EDUC. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Mar. 23, 
2005, at 8 (noting Judith Kleinfeld's contention that while girls previously had only a trivial 
gap in superior grades, today that "gap is fundamentally different"). 
63. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 40. 
64. See id. at 56. 
65. See id. at 42. 
66. See id. at 52-53. 
67. See id. at 54-55. 
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capacity but work habits and conduct) may be what hobbles males 
most."68 At the undergraduate and graduate school levels, the 
complexity of the gender disparities continues. Since the mid-1980s, 
women have earned more than half of all bachelor's degrees and 
now earn more than half of all graduate degrees; however, women 
still earn some graduate degrees consistent with historical gender 
patterns, including obtaining more advanced degrees than men in 
education, psychology, and health sciences.69 
This achievement data, along with the research contending that 
both girls and boys experience adverse treatment in the classroom, 
illustrates the modern-day complexity of educational outcomes 
and experiences along gender lines. Unfortunately, this research 
indicates that both sexes experience discrimination, misidentifica-
tion, and undesirable educational outcomes in distinct ways. This 
complex array of gender equity concerns has led some educators to 
consider single-sex public education as one possible way to address 
the disparate experiences and outcomes of girls and boys. 70 
In addition to examining single-sex education as an option to 
address gender equity issues, urban educators in particular began 
exploring single-sex education as a way to address some of the 
concerns plaguing their districts.71 "[U]rban school districts and 
parents from New York to California cautiously looked toward 
single-sex schooling both to address the much-publicized needs of 
adolescent girls across the economic spectrum and to resolve the 
compelling problems confronting inner-city boys."72 Single-sex 
education may be particularly appealing to urban districts because 
the research of one prominent single-sex researcher, Cornelius 
Riordan, contends that the benefits of single-sex schools for student 
achievement are "limited to students of lower socioeconomic status 
and/or students who are disadvantaged historically-females and 
68. Hulbert, supra note 42, at 14. 
69. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 78, 82. Women earn forty-six percent of all first-
professional degrees in fields such as law, dentistry, and medicine. See id. at 82. 
70. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LoOK AT SINGLE-SEX 
EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 1-3 (1998); SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4-5; Datnow & Hubbard, supra 
note 29, at 2-3; Morgan, supra note 1, at 389-90. 
71. See Minow, supra note 1, at 823 ("It is striking how much of the advocacy for single-
sex public education-for boys as well as for girls--occurs as people try to improve failing 
inner city schools."). 
72. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4-5. 
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raciaVethnic/religious minorities (both males and females). "73 
Because urban school districts have higher concentrations of poor 
and minority students than suburban or rural schools, single-sex 
schools could help educators improve achievement where other 
reforms too often have failed. 
Finally, as noted in the Introduction, the No Child Left Behind 
Act of2001 authorized school districts to use some funds for single-
sex schools and classrooms. 74 The OCR announced in May 2002 that 
it was planning to amend the regulations under Title IX that govern 
these schools. 75 In March 2004, the OCR published its proposed 
revisions to these regulations and signaled its intention to abandon 
its prior interpretation of Title IX, under which a district that 
offered a single-sex public school was required to provide a compara-
ble single-sex public school for the other sex. 76 Instead, the proposed 
regulations would allow a district to offer a single-sex school to one 
sex while providing "substantially equal educational opportunities 
in a single-sex school, single-sex education unit, or coeducational 
school" to the excluded sex.77 If this interpretation is included in the 
final regulation, the elimination of the federal regulatory require-
ment to open two comparable single-sex schools will make single-sex 
schools a more attractive option for some educators. The increased 
flexibility in the federal requirements will also increase educators' 
focus on understanding their constitutional obligations for such 
schools. 
73. Riordan, supra note 51, at 14. Riordan concludes that single-sex schools benefit some 
students because the schools "provide an avenue for students to make a proacademic choice, 
thereby affirming their intrinsic agreement to work in the kind of environment we identify 
as effective and equitable." ld. at 28. 
74. See Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(a)(23), 115 Stat. 1425, 1782 (2001) (to be codified at 
20 u.s.c. § 6301). 
75. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education 
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (proposed 
May 8, 2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106); Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines 
on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102 (proposed May 8, 2002) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. pt. 106). 
76. Compare Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276-77 (proposed March 9, 2004) (to 
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106), with Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,103 (describing the prior 
"longstanding interpretation, policy, and practice to require that the 'comparable school' must 
also be single-sex"). 
77. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,285 (emphasis added). 
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Educators may decide to open single-sex public elementary and 
secondary schools to achieve one or more of several objectives. Those 
objectives are examined next. 
B. The Objectives of Single-Sex Public Schools 
Educators develop and maintain single-sex public schools for a 
variety of reasons. The four objectives examined in this section are 
the following: (1) to improve educational outcomes for students; (2) 
to offer students and parents a diverse array of educational options; 
(3) to compensate students for past or present discrimination; and 
( 4) to conduct an educational experiment. To satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny, the objective must be sufficiently important to support a 
sex classification and the objective must have actually motivated 
the governmental actor.78 Therefore, the objectives for single-sex 
schools should be based on evidence about the current educational 
problems, needs, and barriers that educators are attempting to 
address. 
1. To Improve Educational Outcomes for Students 
Scholars and educators debate whether existing research on 
single-sex schools establishes that single-sex public education will 
benefit students. 79 Several scholars, researchers, and panels of 
78. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S. 
636, 648-49 (1975). 
79. Those who contend that research does not provide evidence that single-sex education 
benefits students include the following: Pamela Haag, Single-Sex Education in Grades K-12, 
in THE JOSSEY-BASS READER ON GENDER IN EDUCATION 647, 661-64 (Elisa Rassen ed., 2002) 
(discussing studies concluding that differences in outcome between single-sex education and 
coeducation cannot be attributed to school type); Brian Johnson, Admitting that Women's Only 
Public Education Is Unconstitutional and Advancing the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 75-85 (2002); Levit, supra note 60, at 489, 503 (contending that 
"[n)umerous studies, both in the United States and abroad, find no significant differences 
between the impact of coeducational and of single-sex schools on student performance and 
achievement" and that "[t)he touted 'general consensus' about positive education and 
socialization effects of single-sex education simply does not exist"); Vojdik, supra note 17, at 
93. Others argue that the research establishes that single-sex education benefits students. 
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 803-06; Morgan, supra note 1, at 397-401, 453; Ransome 
& Moulton, supra note 29, at 596-99; Amanda E. Koman, Note, Urban, Single-Sex, Public 
Secondary Schools: Advancing Full Development of the Talent and Capacities of America's 
Young Women, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 507,526-27 (1998). 
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experts have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the existing 
research and literature on single-sex schools.80 Some scholars, 
however, have indicated that additional research on single-sex 
public education is both needed and desirable.81 
This Article describes some of the research on single-sex educa-
tion that a court could find sufficiently persuasive to establish that 
single-sex education benefits some students82 and thus conclude 
that the objective of a single-sex school is sufficiently important to 
justify a sex classification. For example, research indicates that 
single-sex environments appear to decrease the likelihood that 
girls and boys will view certain subjects as typically masculine or 
feminine. 83 Students also perceive single-sex environments as 
providing higher levels of organization, order, and control. 84 
Single-sex schools also may focus students' attention on academics 
and away from popularity and attractiveness for girls, and athletics 
for boys, which may distract many students from academics in 
coeducational schools.85 For instance, several studies found that 
students in single-sex schools devoted more time to homework, had 
80. See generally AM. AsS'N OFUNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70; 1 OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH 
& IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'TOFEDUC., SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PERSPECTIVES FROM PRACTICE 
AND RESEARCH (Debra K Hollinger ed., 1993); SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 188-236; Patricia 
B. Campbell & Jo Sanders, Challenging the System: Assumptions and Data Behind the Push 
for Single-Sex Schooling, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 31, 31-46; 
Haag, supra note 79, at 647-76; Riordan, supra note 51, at 10-30; Levit, supra note 60, at 464-
526; Fred A. Mael, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to Socioemotional 
and Academic Development, 68 REV. Enuc. RES. 101 (1998). One problem with some of the 
research is the tremendous difficulty in separating out the impact of the single-sex 
environment from other attributes of the single-sex environment. See Minow, supra note 1, 
at 827. 
81. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235-36; Riordan, supra note 51, at 13; Isabelle K 
Pinzler, Separate but Equal Education in the Context of Gender, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 785, 
804-05 (2004). 
82. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70, at 2; 1 OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH & 
IMPROVEMENT, supra note 80, at ii (finding that "single-sex education provides educational 
benefits for some students"); SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 198-227, 235; Haag, supra note 79, 
at 664-70 (noting that some "[s)tudies that have discovered positive achievement outcomes 
attributable to the single-sex environment have all dealt with single-sex schools rather than 
classes," and that research does reveal a consensus on the benefits of single-sex education on 
some indicators); Mael, supra note 80, at 117. 
83. See SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 235; Haag, supra note 79, at 653-54; Mael, supra 
note 80, at 111. But see SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 208 (noting several studies with contrary 
results). 
84. See Haag, supra note 79, at 655. 
85. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 198-200. 
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higher aspirations for their academic and educational achievement, 
and wanted to be remembered for their scholastic abilities, rather 
than for their leadership in student activities or popularity.86 
Studies that find positive effects in single-sex schools emphasize 
that the characteristics of students' peer groups, including more 
academically oriented peers, and peer influence may affect outcomes 
and be indirectly related to the school's composition.87 
Studies also reveal a consensus that girls educated in single-sex 
environments show a greater preference for science, technology, and 
math than girls educated in coeducational environments.88 In 
addition, more positive attitudes of girls toward science and math 
in single-sex schools may influence course enrollment and decisions 
in their careers; however, research is mixed on whether a more 
positive attitude improves achievement in these subjects.89 Studies 
have consistently found that while girls in coeducational schools 
may draw their self-concept from their physical appearance, "girls 
in single-sex schools may draw greater confidence from academic 
competence. "9° Furthermore, girls are subjected to harassment from 
the opposite sex more than boys, and single-sex schools reduce the 
opportunities for this type ofharassment to occur.91 Some conclude, 
however, that the positive impact of single-sex education for girls 
depends on the relationships, values, and environment within the 
school.92 
The research on the impact of single-sex education on boys is less 
conclusive. Some researchers and scholars conclude that boys 
perform better in coeducational environments and that single-sex 
86. See id. at 199; Mael, supra note 80, at 107. 
87. See Haag, supra note 79, at 669. 
88. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 207-08, 235; Haag, supra note 79, at 653; Levit, 
supra note 60, at 493; Mael, supra note 80, at 108-09, 111. But see Levit, supra note 60, at 494 
(noting one study that did not find a positive effect on girls' attitudes regarding math). 
89. Compare SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 207 ("Research from more developed countries 
has generally found that although girls tend to have less gendered and more positive attitudes 
toward math and science in single-sex schools, which may influence their subsequent course 
enrollment and career choices, that advantage does not necessarily pay off in the short run 
in achievement gains."), with Mael, supra note 80, at 108-09 (discussing several studies that 
found higher achievement for girls in math or science in single-sex schools). 
90. Haag, supra note 79, at 670. 
91. See Mael, supra note 80, at 115. Single-sex schools do not eliminate the possibility for 
sexual harassment to occur because students may be harassed by students of the same sex. 
92. See Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36. 
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schools disadvantage boys.93 For example, Nancy Levit contends 
that "the majority of research suggests that boys are served best, 
academically and socially, in coeducational environments. The 
effects of single-sex education for boys thus are at best, neutral, and 
at worst, negative. "94 Other research suggests that some boys, 
particularly disadvantaged boys, benefit from single-sex education. 95 
For example, Cornelius Riordan's research indicates that "[s]ingle-
sex schools do not greatly influence the academic achievement of 
affluent or advantaged students, but they do for poor disadvantaged 
students .... [W]hite middle-class (or affluent) boys and girls do not 
suffer any loss by attending a single-sex school.. .. At worse, they 
realize a neutral outcome .... "96 One researcher has contended that 
the disparate research outcomes for girls and boys in single-sex 
schools result from the overwhelming focus of researchers on girls.97 
The parties in United States v. Virginia that challenged the 
Virginia Military Institute's single-sex admissions policy did not 
contest that "[s]ingle-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to 
at least some students."98 Given the research supporting this 
conclusion, the Court is unlikely to reject it in the near future. 
Improved educational outcomes also typically underlie the objectives 
of single-sex public schools discussed below. 
2. To Offer Diverse Educational Opportunities 
Offering single-sex and coeducational schools can increase 
diversity in educational institutions because it allows students and 
parents to choose the school that best fits a student's educational 
and developmental needs. 99 For example, in developing a pilot study 
of single-sex schools in California, the California Department of 
Education made clear that the principal purpose was to increase the 
93. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 220 (noting that the conclusion that "coeducation 
might better serve boys" is a "general theme running through the literature"). 
94. Levit, supra note 60, at 500. 
95. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235. 
96. Riordan, supra note 51, at 18. 
97. See Mael, supra note 80, at 117. 
98. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,535 (1996). 
99. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 867-68; Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public 
Single-Sex Education, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL 'V 227, 251-52 (1994). 
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options for public school students. 100 Proponents of increasing 
school choice contend that such choice can empower families to 
select the most effective schools for their children and can increase 
the educational options for low-income children, who are typically 
denied the choices that upper income children routinely exercise.101 
Proponents also contend that school choice will encourage competi-
tion between public and private schools that may cause both public 
and private schools to improve and that school choice can be used 
to promote equal educational opportunity.102 While diversity in 
educational opportunities only contributes value if the additional 
educational opportunities offered are "educationally beneficial,"103 
the research evidence discussed above supports the contention that 
single-sex education will benefit some students.104 
The Court's opinion in Virginia strongly supports the conclusion 
that the Court will find increasing diversity of educational options 
a sufficiently important objective for single-sex schools, at least 
when such div~rsity is offered to both sexes. The Court indicated 
that it did "not question the Commonwealth's prerogative evenhand-
edly to support diverse educational opportunities," in response to 
arguments from amici about the potential benefit of single-sex 
100. See AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., IS SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PuBLIC 
SECTOR?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S PILOT PROGRAM 6 (2001); SALOMONE, supra note 17, 
at 228-29. This is also one ofthe goals of the proposed amendments to the Title IX regulations 
for single-sex schools. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or 
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (proposed May 8, 2002) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
101. See Howard Fuller, The Continuing Struggle for School Choice, in EDUCATIONAL 
FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA: BROWN V. BOARD AFTER HALF A CENTURY 1, 2-4 (David 
Salisbury & Casey Lartigue, Jr. eds., 2004) [hereinafter EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN 
AMERICA). 
102. See Paul E. Peterson, The Meaning of Zelman and the Future of School Choice, in 
EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 101, at 53, 66; Gerard Toussaint 
Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of School Choice?: A Legal and Policy 
Perspective, 45 How. L.J. 281, 335 (2002) ("It would better serve our nation and its 
schoolchildren if we discover innovative ways to use school choice as a means to achieve 
desegregation, integration, nondiscrimination, and equal educational opportunity."). 
103. Morgan, supra note 1, at 398-99. 
104. But see Jenny L. Matthews, Comment,Admission Denied: An Examination of a Single· 
Sex Public School Initiative in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REv. 2032, 2056 (2004) (arguing 
that offering a diversity of educational options is not an important governmental interest 
because it is not an end, but rather a means, to achieve the important goal of successfully 
educating all students). 
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schools.105 The Court concluded that Virginia could not establish 
that it adopted the single-sex policy at VMI to promote diverse 
educational opportunities because Virginia's history of single-sex 
and coeducational public schools revealed that VMI's exclusion of 
women was not adopted for this purpose.106 Nevertheless, Virginia's 
failure to make this showing will not preclude a school district 
from establishing a genuine interest in providing a variety of 
educational opportunities in single-sex and coeducational schools in 
the future. 107 
3. To Remedy Discrimination 
Single-sex schools also may be developed to address past or 
present discrimination in coeducational schools.108 Such discrimi-
nation may include sexual harassment and disparate treatment 
that may harm the achievement of girls.109 Past discrimination 
against girls and women may affect not only educational outcomes, 
but it may also affect the career aspirations and choices that girls 
105. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,534 n.7 (1996) (emphasis added); cf Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (upholding the Cleveland, Ohio, voucher 
program that allowed students to choose among public and private schools). 
106. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535. 
107. For example, a genuine interest in offering choice could be demonstrated by a district 
offering students a variety of educational options, such as specialized schools that focus on 
particular subject areas like math or science. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 13 (discussing 
the fact that the neighborhood in which New York City opened its first single-sex school 
already included a number of educational options for students). 
108. See SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 171 (quoting the argument made by Deborah Brake 
of the National Women's Law Center that the network of programs and scholarships for girls 
and women may be legitimate, "[i]n light of the history of discrimination against women in 
education and the barriers that female students continue to face based on their gender"); 
Willinger, supra note 37, at 273-75, 278 (noting that some argue that "all-girls schools or all-
girls classrooms are necessary as a response to gender discrimination in the classroom. There 
is widespread evidence of the prevalence of such discrimination, and increasingly this 
evidence forms the basis of arguments in favor of single-sex education for girls"). 
109. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text. 
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make if they perceive a field to be unwelcoming or unavailable.110 
Schools also could identify and address discrimination against boys. 
The Court acknowledged in Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan that "[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classifica-
tion favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly 
assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened. "111 
However, a state actor that adopts a sex classification to remedy 
discrimination must demonstrate that "members of the gender 
benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related 
to the classification."112 Therefore, a school district could only 
develop a single-sex school to address discrimination if it identified 
ways in which girls or boys had been harmed by discrimination and 
tailored the program to address that harm.113 For example, some 
contend that the Young Women's Leadership School (YWLS) in 
Harlem, which emphasizes math and science, was established to 
address past discrimination against girls and women, including the 
discrimination that girls experienced in coeducational schools and 
the low participation rates of women in math and science occupa-
tions.114 A district that establishes a single-sex school for remedial 
purposes should also present evidence that it is attempting to 
address past or present discrimination in its coeducational schools, 
110. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 35, at 117 ("Despite the many programs 
and guidelines devoted to reducing bias and efforts by counselors, the media, and others 
involved in education, occupational sex-role socialization still pervades and inhibits the career 
exploration process."); see also Pat Galloway, "Bad Idea. You'll Flunk Out," TIME, Mar. 7, 
2005, at 58-59 (describing the author's persistent efforts to overcome the repeated 
discouragement she encountered when she expressed her interest in becoming an engineer 
as a young woman and throughout her engineering career). 
111. 458 u.s. 718, 728 (1982). 
112. Id. 
113. Although the Court has previously upheld sex classifications that remedy past 
discrimination against girls and women, some might question whether the historical 
discrimination that girls and women experienced remains a sufficient justification for a sex 
classification in today's schools, particularly because the Supreme Court has not addressed 
such a classification in recent years. However, examining this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For the purposes of this Article, the assumption is made that past discrimination 
against girls and women remains an important governmental interest that would support a 
sex classification today. 
114. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 59, 63 
(1997); Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and 
East Harlem's Young Women's Leadership School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (1997). But 
see Vojdik, supra note 17, at 97 ("Ult is not clear that New York City school officials agreed 
to create YWLS to redress past discrimination in public education."). 
1978 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1953 
because a failure to do so could undermine an argument that the 
district is actually attempting to remedy discrimination. 
4. To Conduct an Educational Experiment 
Another possible objective of single-sex schools is to conduct an 
experiment that examines the outcomes of such schools. An 
experiment may assess if and when single-sex public schools 
result in unique benefits for students, which students benefit from 
single-sex schools, and how to increase the benefits and reduce 
any negative ramifications of such schools. Such an experiment 
could address some of the deficiencies in the existing research on 
single-sex schools by attempting to control for factors that may have 
influenced past results.115 Courts could conclude that an educational 
experiment on the benefits of single-sex public education is suffi-
ciently important to support a sex classification.116 
In light of the potential objectives that could serve as an impor-
tant governmental interest for establishing single-sex schools, 
the next section describes some of the recent successes and short-
comings of single-sex schools and briefly examines the history of 
single-sex schools. 
C. The Successes and Failures of Present and Past Si7Jgle-Sex 
Public Schools 
The growth in single-sex education over the last decade, particu-
larly in recent years, has been tremendous and has resulted in 
numerous successes, as well as some failures. Although only three 
single-sex public schools existed in this country in 1995 (excluding 
schools for pregnant girls), by April 2006 the NASSPE identified 
forty-four single-sex public elementary and secondary schools that 
operated in the United States during the 2005-06 school year.117 
Eleven single-sex public schools opened or became single-sex in the 
115. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235-36; Pinzler, supra note 81, at 805-06. 
116. The Ninth Circuit previously upheld educational research on how to improve 
education in urban public schools as a compelling state interest that justified the use of race 
as a factor in admissions to an elementary school in California. See Hunter v. Regents of the 
Univ. ofCRI., 190 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). 
117. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
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2004-05 school year and thirteen additional public schools became 
single-sex in the 2005-06 school year.118 In addition to sex-segre-
gated schools, the NASSPE reported that 165 schools offered one or 
more single-sex classes as of April 2006.119 In sum, at least 209 
schools offered some form of single-sex education by April 2006.120 
The new generation of single-sex public schools is typically 
composed of either solitary institutions or pairs of similar schools 
with one school for each sex. Of the forty-four single-sex public 
schools on the NASSPE's website, for the 2005-06 school year, 
~ighteen appear to be "dual academies," or two single-sex schools 
that provide similar educational opportunities to girls and boys, 
although a careful assessment of the nature and location of these 
schools would be necessary to determine if students are in fact 
provided similar opportunities.121 Although the structure of dual 
academies may vary from state to state, such schools typically serve 
both sexes in the same or nearby facilities, separating students into 
single-sex classrooms.122 At some dual academies, girls and boys 
may participate together in extracurricular activities, lunchtime, 
or even some academic subjects, and they may interact before and 
118. See id. 
119. See Nat'l Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Classrooms, 
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-classrooms.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter 
NASSPE, Classrooms). 
120. See id.; NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
121. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. The schools in the 2004-05 school year that 
appeared to offer similar opportunities and grade levels to boys and girls are the following: 
the San Francisco 49ers Academies in East Palo Alto, California; the Jefferson Leadership 
Academies in Long Beach, California; Thurgood Marshall Elementary School in Seattle, 
Washington; Brighter Choice Charter School in Albany, New York; FitzSimons High School 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Southern Leadership Academies in Louisville, Kentucky; 
Withrow University High School in Cincinnati, Ohio; Westwind Middle School Academy in 
Phoenix, Arizona; Lincoln and Stewart Elementary Schools in Toledo, Ohio; James Irwin 
Middle School in Colorado Springs, Colorado; Mount Scott Learning Centers in Portland, 
Oregon; Pepper Middle School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Crossroads Preparatory 
Academy and the Harte School in Columbus, Ohio; the Chase Academy for Communication 
Arts in Columbus, Ohio; Minneapolis Academy in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Capitol Pre-
College Academy for Girls and Capitol Pre-College Academy for Boys in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana; The Langston Charter Middle School in Greenville, South Carolina; the Athena 
School of Excellence for Girls and the Alpha School of Excellence for Boys in Youngstown, 
Ohio; and the Charles Drew Elementary School and Duncan Elementary School in Gary, 
Indiana. To reach nineteen schools that have offered similar opportunities for both sexes, this 
Article counts separate schools that appeared paired together to offer single-sex opportunities 
to each sex as one school. See id. 
122. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 227-28. 
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after school. 123 For example, at the Brighter Choice Charter Schools 
(BCCS) in Albany, New York, girls and boys share the same 
building, teachers, and learning resources.124 The school has a 
unique "Learning Guarantee" through which the school will pay for 
tuition to a private school if a student with good attendance for 
three years fails any statewide reading, science, or math exam.125 
The students are primarily African Americans and Hispanic 
Americans, and the school only admits students whose family 
income is below the poverty line.126 The school has shown promising 
results since opening in 2002, including student math and reading 
scores that are substantially higher than those for other economi-
cally disadvantaged students nationwide.127 
The Thurgood Marshall Elementary School in Seattle, 
Washington, achieved noteworthy success after it separated the 
sexes into different classrooms.128 While none of the girls passed the 
math portion of the state exam in the year before the change, fifty-
three percent of the girls passed in the year after the change.129 The 
boys' scores on the reading portion of this test improved "from the 
lOth percentile to the 66th percentile. "130 Discipline referrals that 
were at thirty per day before the change dropped to fewer than 
two per day after the change.131 Similarly, ninety-five percent ofthe 
students at Withrow University High School in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
passed the state reading proficiency test in 2003-04., while only 
forty-five percent passed the test before the school b~came single-
sex.132 
In addition to dual academies or pairs of single-sex schools, some 
school districts offer a single-sex school for only one sex. Through 
the 2005-06 school year, a review of the forty-four single-sex schools 
listed on the NASSPE website revealed that at least eight single-sex 
123. See id. at 228. 
124. See id. at 233-34. 
125. See NASSPE, supra note 5. 
126. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 25. 
127. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 233-34; Gains in Student Perfonnance at Brighter 
Choice Charter Schools, 4th-Grade Cohort (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.brighterchoice.org/ 
TestScores. pdf. 
128. See Sax, supra note 22. 
129. See id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. 
132. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
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girls' schools appeared to exist without a similar school for boys 
serving the same grades and geographic region, and at least five 
boys' schools did not have a similar school for girls serving the same 
grades and geographic region.133 
Two of the girls' schools, the Philadelphia High School for Girls 
and Western High School in Baltimore, opened in the mid-1840s 
and have since remained all girls' schools.134 These schools also have 
achieved considerable success. The Philadelphia School for Girls 
serves over fifteen hundred predominantly poor students in grades 
nine through twelve. 135 The magnet school has rigorous admissions 
standards and the students have a ninety-eight percent acceptance 
rate to college.136 The school is one of three Philadelphia high 
schools with a zero percent dropout rate, and it consistently scores 
among the top schools in the city on statewide math, reading, and 
writing tests.137 Similarly, Western High School has a very high 
statewide test score passage rate, a high college placement rate, and 
133. See id. In the 2005-06 school year, the eight girls' schools that did not appear to have 
a similar school for boys serving the same grades and geographic region were the following: 
Western High School in Baltimore, Maryland; Philadelphia High School for Girls in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Spectrum High School for Girls in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Young 
Women's Leadership School in New York, New York; Young Women's Leadership Charter 
School in Chicago, Illinois; Middle College High School in Guilford County, North Carolina; 
Irma Rangel Young Women's Leadership School in Dallas, Texas; and Charity Adams Earley 
Academy for Girls in Dayton, Ohio. ld. The five boys' schools that did not appear to have a 
similar school for girls serving the same grades and geographic region are Pro-Vision in 
Houston, Texas; William A. Lawson Institute for Peace and Prosperity Preparatory Academy 
for Boys in Houston, Texas; Middle College at North Carolina A&T in Guilford County, North 
Carolina; Bedford Stuyvesant Preparatory Charter School for Excellence in Brooklyn, New 
York; and Edgar Evans Elementary School in Indianapolis, Indiana. I d. For a thoughtful 
analysis of why Middle College High School and Middle College at North Carolina A&T do not 
provide substantially equal opportunities for girls and boys, see Matthews, supra note 104, 
at 2043. 
Assessing whether six of the eight single-sex schools in New York City provide 
substantially equal opportunities for girls and boys is difficult. These schools are the Eagle 
Academy for Young Men; the Urban Assembly Academy for History and Citizenship for Young 
Men; Girls Prep; the Young Women's Leadership School, Queen's Campus; the Urban 
Assembly School of Business for Young Women; and the Young Women's Leadership School 
of the Bronx. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. Therefore, these schools have been excluded 
from the analysis about whether schools are substantially equal or solitary single-sex schools. 
134. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 24-25. 
135. Id. at 25. 
136. Id. 
137. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 31. 
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a low dropout rate. 138 The school educates over one thousand 
students, who are mostly African American, and about forty percent 
ofthe students qualify for free and reduced-price lunches.139 
A more recently opened single-sex public school is the YWLS in 
New York City's East Harlem, which serves predominantly poor 
African American and Hispanic American students.140 The school 
opened in the fall of 1996 and graduated its first class, consisting of 
thirty-two students, in 2001.141 YWLS emphasizes math, science, 
technology, leadership, and the humanities, providing a middle and 
high school education.142 Teachers and staff give students "intense 
and personalized attention," and class size is smaller than classes 
in most other New York City public schools.143 Rosemary Salomone 
describes the school in her thought-provoking book on single-sex 
education entitled Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking Single-Sex 
Schooling as "an oasis of excellence and hope in a desert ofpoverty, 
crime, and despair."144 The school's success in its first few years has 
been noteworthy. All of the students in the first two graduating 
classes were admitted to college, and the students' academic 
achievement continues to improve.145 In math and reading, the 
students typically score "[thirty] percent higher than average for 
students in other New York City coeducational schools."146 
Finally, at least five boys' schools on NASPPE's website do not 
appear to have a similar school for girls serving the . .same grades 
and geographic region.147 For example, in Houston, Texas, two 
schools are limited only to boys. The William A. Lawson Institute 
for Peace and Prosperity Preparatory Academy for Boys serves sixth 
through eighth grade boys.148 Its academic program focuses on 
activities, provides mentors in academic subjects, integrates 
math and science technology, and addresses student behavior 
138. !d. at 34. 
139. !d. at 32-33; NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
140. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 24. 
141. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 10, 13. 
142. ld. at 13; Riordan, supra note 51, at 24. 
143. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 21. 
144. Id. at 18. 
145. Id. at 24. 
146. Riordan, supra note 51, at 24. 
147. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
148. See Houston lndep. Sch. Dist. (HISD), HISD Charter Schools, http://dept.houstonisd. 
org/charterschools/charterlist.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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management through a student court system.149 The other school, 
Pro-Vision, is a small all-boys' residential school that focuses on 
at-risk youth. 150 
Not all single-sex schools have experienced the success of the 
schools noted above.151 For example, two middle schools, one in 
Newport, Kentucky, and one in Idaho Falls, Idaho, abandoned all 
single-sex classrooms after one year when they failed to achieve 
significant grade or test score improvement.152 At Newport Middle 
School, discipline referrals for the boys soared.153 In addition, a 2001 
study of a Califomia pilot program, in which six districts opened 
single-sex academies for each sex, found that "[t]raditional gender 
stereotypes were often reinforced in the single gender academies."154 
These stereotypes still existed, even though a focus of the legislation 
and policymakers "was to ensure equality of the boys' and girls' 
academies."155 The study concluded that educators focused on 
equality of resources, while failing to "adequately reflect upon the 
hidden or overt gender biases (to the disadvantage ofboth boys and 
girls) that often existed in their organizational, pedagogical, and 
curricular practices. "156 For example, one district taught America's 
early history by teaching boys about survival skills, while girls 
learned about sewing and quilting.157 Even more troubling was the 
finding that the separation of "boys and girls on the same campus 
led to a dichotomous understanding of gender, where girls were seen 
as 'good' and boys were seen as 'bad.'"158 
These problems echo some ofthe early shortcomings of single-sex 
public education in the United States, and they remind those who 
are currently considering this option of the potential misuses and 
dangers of single-sex public schools. Single-sex education has a 
troubled history in the United States.159 Initially, only boys were 
149. See id. 
150. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
151. See Sax, supra note 22. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 7. 
155. I d. at 22. 
156. I d. at 6. 
157. See id. at 40. 
158. ld. at 7. 
159. "[P]ublic education in America began as single-sex schooling and very unequal single-
sex schooling at that." Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, Of Two Minds: Single-Sex 
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offered education in most instances; girls were provided limited 
opportunities in summer schools or after the boys had left 
school.16° Financial constraints and convenience, rather than 
concerns about pedagogy or child development, drove the move 
toward coeducational schools, particularly in rural areas. 161 
Beyond the elementary grades, teachers initially taught girls and 
boys the same subjects; however, industrialization and rapid 
migration prompted schools to focus on preparing students for the 
practical realities of their traditional roles in society-that is, girls 
as homemakers and boys as breadwinners.162 High schools began to 
focus on vocational education that offered different opportunities 
to the sexes, including secretarial skills and homemaking for girls, 
and auto mechanics and woodworking for boys.163 These gender 
distinctions affected some academic courses that were viewed as 
more suitable for boys or for girls.164 In some areas, including cities 
such as New York and Boston, girls were provided a secondary 
education in single-sex schools that generally had a more limited 
curriculum and less funding per student than boys' schools.165 
Eventually, most of the single-sex public schools closed, and by 
1900, ninety-eight percent of the public secondary schools in the 
United States were coeducational.166 Nevertheless, limited instances 
of single-sex education, along with their attendant stereotypes and 
inferior opportunities for women, persisted into the twentieth 
century.167 
The stereotyping and shortcomings of past and present single-sex 
schools, and the success of some of the new single-sex schools, 
confirm that single-sex education must be handled with great care. 
Education, Coeducation, and the Search for Gender Equity in K-12 Public Schooling, 14 N. Y.L. 
ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 289, 290 (1997). 
160. DAVID TYACK & ELIZABETH HANSON, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF 
COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PuBLIC SCHOOlS 13-20 (1992). 
161. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 66-67; TYACK& HANSON, supra note 160, at 47, 58; 
Jill E. Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women's "Full Citizenship": A Case Study of Sex-
Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755,802-03 (2002). 
162. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 66, 68. 
163. See id. at 69. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at 67; TYACK & HANSON, supra note 160, at 8. 
166. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 67; Riordan, supra note 51, at 10; Mael, supra note 
80, at 102. 
167. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 795-806. 
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Single-sex schools may be beneficial or harmful to students, 
depending on how they are operated. The constitutional framework 
for analyzing such schools should take into account the potential 
benefits and harms that different structures of single-sex schools 
may cause. Parts II and III examine how neither the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of intermediate scrutiny nor scholarly 
approaches to single-sex public schools effectively address these 
concerns.168 
II. THE MANY FACES OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
In light of the potential benefits of single-sex public schools, it is 
important that educators have clear guidance on their constitutional 
obligations, so that they are not lost in a constitutional labyrinth 
that discourages experimentation. Educators also should not face 
constitutional hurdles to such schools that do not enhance the value 
of these schools. However, the constitutional requirements should 
include adequate safeguards that protect children from the potential 
dangers of such schools, including harmful stereotypes. Courts 
that adjudicate the constitutionality of single-sex public schools 
should reach similar conclusions when evaluating similar schools. 
Unfortunately, neither educators nor courts will find in the existing 
Supreme Court case law on sex classifications the constitutional 
clarity, relevance, and consistency that would create optimal 
conditions for the development of single-sex public schools. 
Since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Craig v. Boren, the 
Court has subjected sex classifications to intermediate scrutiny, 
which requires that a sex classification serve an important govern-
mental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of 
168. As the number of single-sex schools increases, single-sex schools may be more likely 
to spur litigation. For the moment, this new generation of single-sex public schools has not 
yet resulted in substantial litigation, although one court prevented the opening of a single-sex 
school for African American boys in Detroit. See Garrett v. Bd. ofEduc., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 
1014 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that the important purpose of the academies in addressing 
the crises facing urban males was "insufficient to override the rights of females to equal 
opportunities"). Also, the New York City chapter of the National Organization for Women and 
other civil liberties groups filed a complaint in 1996 with OCR against YWLS that has not yet 
been resolved. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 15-18. Apparently, some schools avoid litigation 
by not having an official single-sex admissions policy. See id. at 32, 34-35. 
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that objective.169 The requirement of a substantial relationship 
between the sex classification and the government's objective has 
been described as "(t]he most important difference between 
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review."170 The substantial 
relationship test considers whether a sex-neutral alternative would 
serve the state's objective as well as, or sometimes better than, the 
sex classification.171 The Court typically does not permit the state to 
utilize a sex-based classification when the state could achieve its 
objective through a sex-neutral classification.172 
To withstand the substantial relationship test, the state's 
evidence must also demonstrate how the sex differential furthers 
the state's objective-that is, why males and females should be 
treated differently to achieve the state's objective.173 Different 
treatment of those who are similarly situated with respect to 
the legislation's purpose undermines the state's argument that 
the. classification significantly furthers the stated objective.174 
Furthermore, even when a sufficiently valuable objective is at stake 
and this objective can arguably be achieved through a sex classifica-
tion, the Court typically invalidates classifications that rest on 
169_. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
170. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
171. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (stating that when the state's objective 
is "as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore 
carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on 
the basis of sex"); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he availability 
of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often highly probative of the validity 
of the classification."). 
172. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980) (holding that a 
sex classification that sought to provide for needy spouses by paying benefits to all female 
surviving spouses, while requiring men to prove dependency, did not substantially further an 
important objective because the needs of both female and male survivors could be served by 
granting benefits either to those who demonstrate need or to all survivors); Orr, 440 U.S. at 
281-83 (holding an Alabama state statute unconstitutional that required alimony to be paid 
to women, but not to men, because the state conducted individualized hearings to assess the 
financial circumstances of the spouses, and these hearings provided a more accurate 
assessment of an individual's needs). As noted in Part II.A-B, the Court has not consistently 
enforced this requirement. 
173. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 203-04 (holding a law unconstitutional that prohibited the 
selling of 3.2% alcohol content beer to men until they reached twenty-one years of age, while 
permitting the selling of the same beer to women after they turned eighteen because, 
although the statistics demonstrated an increase in driving under the influence of alcohol, 
they did not relate this trend to the "age-sex differentials" before the Court). 
174. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150-52; Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 
77 (1971). 
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overbroad generalizations175 or that reflect or perpetuate stereotypes 
about gender rolesP6 Laws based on such overbroad generalizations 
or stereotypes are generally unconstitutional, even if some empirical 
evidence supports them.177 
Although these guidelines appear within the Court's intermediate 
scrutiny cases, the Court's interpretation of the substantial 
relationship component has not been consistent. Instead, the Court's 
opinions reflect a range of interpretations of the substantial 
relationship requirement in which the requirement is sometimes 
quite demanding and sometimes substantially less demanding. This 
Part analyzes these disparate interpretations of the substantial 
relationship component of intermediate scrutiny and identifies some 
of the problems these interpretations could create for single-sex 
public schools. 
A. The Most Demanding Interpretation of the Substantial 
Relationship Test 
Although the Court in United States v. Virginia and Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan used much of the same language 
that it used in other sex classification cases,178 the Court's applica-
tion of the intermediate scrutiny standard essentially required the 
state to deiJ1,0nstrate that the state could not achieve its objective 
unless it excluded the other sex. In Hogan, the Supreme Court held 
in a five-to-four decision that Mississippi lacked an "exceedingly 
persuasive justification" for maintaining a single-sex nursing school 
175. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994); see also Norman R. 
Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender 
Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 185, 221-22 (2003) ("In a series 
of cases, the Court has struck down classifications as being based on stereotypical overbroad 
generalizations that a woman's place is in the home, women are less capable than men, and 
women are financially dependent on men."). 
176. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 & n.23 
(1973); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 731-33 (2d ed. 
2002). 
177. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150-52; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977); see 
also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("(O]verbroad sex-based 
generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical support."). 
178. See Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: 
The Young Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 105-
06 (1997). 
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for women.179 Although Mississippi claimed that the all-female 
admissions policy addressed past discrimination against women, the 
State failed to demonstrate that women did not have avenues to 
pursue nursing training or to obtain leadership positions in nursing 
either when the school opened or when the policy was challenged.180 
In fact, the females-only admissions policy perpetuated a stereotype 
that the nursing profession is only for women.181 Because the 
classification was not actually adopted to achieve the alleged 
objective, the Court held the policy invalid.182 
In addition, Mississippi failed to demonstrate that the classifica-
tion was directly and substantially related to the alleged objective.183 
The Court held that the university's policy of allowing men to audit 
classes "fatally undermine[d] [Mississippi's] claim that women, at 
least those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by the 
presence ofmen."184 The record revealed that allowing men to attend 
the school would not affect the academic performance of women at 
the school or the style in which classes were taught.185 Furthermore, 
"men in coeducational nursing schools do not dominate the class-
room."186 In light of the lack of evidence to prove any adverse effect 
on women from the presence of men at the school, the Court held 
that denying admission to men was clearly not "necessary to reach 
any of MUW's educational goals."187 
Similarly, in Virginia, by rejecting Virginia's argument that the 
single-sex nature of VMI was essential to train citizen-soldiers, 188 
the Court required a single-sex environment to be necessary to train 
citizen-soldiers.189 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court's seven-to-
179. 458 U.S. 718, 731, 733 (1982). The Mississippi University for Women was Mississippi's 
only single-sex institution of higher education; therefore, the Court did not address whether 
Mississippi could offer "'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and 
females." Id. at 720 n.l. 
180. See id. at 727-29. 
181. Id. at 729. 
182. ld. at 730. 
183. ld. 
184. ld. 
185. See id. at 731. 
186. ld. 
187. ld. (emphasis added). 
188. "Citizen-soldiers" is the term that VMI uses to describe its graduates. See United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 521-22 (1996). 
189. See id. at 540-46. 
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one majority, 190 held that Virginia could not exclude women from the 
unique educational benefits provided at VMI.191 Virginia offered two 
justifications for excluding women from VMI: (1) the benefits of 
single-sex education and the contribution of single-sex education 
to diverse educational approaches would be lost if women were 
admitted; and (2) admission of women would require Virginia to 
modify the "adversative method"192 VMI adopted to develop 
character and train leaders.193 No party in the litigation contested 
the notion that some students receive pedagogical benefits from 
single-sex education or the suggestion that "diversity among public 
educational institutions can serve the public good. "194 Instead, a 
review of Virginia's history of excluding women from higher 
education, providing them an inferior education, and converting 
schools to coeducational institutions, 195 resulted in the Court finding 
the first justification lacking because Virginia had not demonstrated 
"that VMI was established, or ha[d] been maintained, with a view 
to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational 
opportunities within the Commonwealth. "196 
The Court also rejected Virginia's evidence of "gender-based 
developmental differences" -including the contention that although 
men thrive in a more adversative atmosphere, women need a more 
cooperative environment-as a justification for excluding women 
from VMI.197 The Court concluded that gender-based developmental 
differences could not justify the exclusion of women from VMI 
because the record revealed that some women had the will, capacity, 
and interest to fulfill all of the demands facing VMI cadets. 198 In 
light of this evidence, "'neither the goal of producing citizen solders,' 
190. Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court's opinion in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurring opinion. 
Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Thomas took no part in the decision. I d. at 518. 
191. See id. at 519, 523, 553. 
192. VMI's adversative method employs "'[p]hysicial rigor, mental stress, absolute equality 
of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in 
desirable values'" to prepare the cadets to be "citizen-soldiers." ld. at 522 (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.O. Va. 1991)). 
193. See id. at 535. 
194. ld. 
195. See id. at 536-38. 
196. ld. at 535. 
197. ld. at 541-43. 
198. See id. at 520, 540-42. 
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VMI's raison d'etre, 'nor VMI's implementing methodology [was] 
inherently unsuitable to women.'"199 Furthermore, because some 
women could satisfy the demands of VMI's methodology, the 
prediction that the presence of women would downgrade VMI's 
stature and destroy the adversative method was no more worthy 
of credence than past predictions that the admission of women to 
the practice of law or medicine would destroy those professions.200 
If the Commonwealth could still achieve its goal of training 
citizen-soldiers after abandoning the single-sex admissions policy, 
achievement of its goal was "not substantially advanced by women's 
categorical exclusion ... from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-
soldier' corps."201 In short, Virginia's fears about the adverse effects 
of admitting women were not grounded in reality, and these 
unfounded fears certainly did not meet the demanding "exceedingly 
persuasive" standard required for sex classifications.202 This 
conclusion indicates that VMI's admissions policy was invalidated 
because Virginia failed to demonstrate that excluding women was 
necessary to achieve its goal. 203 
199. ld. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
200. See id. at 543-45. 
201. ld. at 546. 
202. I d. at 534. 
203. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal 
Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 V AND. L. 
REv. 845, 880-82, 893 (1997) (arguing that Virginia's requirement that VMI make 
institutional alterations for privacy is consistent with a standard that "only necessary 
differential treatment is permissible. If there is a less discriminatory way in which the 
institution can achieve its result, then unequal treatment is unnecessary." (emphasis added)); 
Minow, supra note 1, at 830 (noting that the Court in Virginia "rejected the arguments that 
single-sex education was necessary because of the physical training, absence of privacy, and 
adversative method used at VMI" (emphasis added)); Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex 
Education: Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 721 
(contending that to survive the substantial relationship test, YWLS "must show that the 
exclusion of young men is somewhat necessary to accomplishing its objective of compensating 
women" (emphasis added)); Monica J. Stamm, Note, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex 
Schools for Pregnant Girls, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1223-24 (1998) (arguing that Justice 
Ginsburg "rejected the arguments of VMI's defenders that the presence of women would so 
change the institution as to deny all its students the kind of distinctive education they might 
have hoped to get there. In so doing, Ginsburg analyzed whether the exclusion of women from 
VMI was necessary for the military college to obtain its objectives." (second emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted)). But see Morgan, supra note 1, at 411 ("[T]he Court has never interpreted 
intermediate scrutiny to require that sex-based classifications be the most narrowly tailored 
means available to achieve a government objective. Whether or not alternative means are 
available, if the sex-specific legislation furthers the government objective and passes an anti-
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The adoption of a requirement that a sex classification must be 
necessary to achieve its important objective was particularly 
noteworthy because this least-restrictive-means analysis is typically 
reserved for strict scrutiny of suspect classifications, 204 such as 
those based on race, which are only permitted when they are, among 
other things, "necessary to further a compelling governmental 
interest."205 Nevertheless, the Court's demanding interpretation206 
subordination test, the Court has upheld the use of those classifications." (footnote omitted)); 
Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 43, 
44-45 (1997) (arguing that the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in Virginia and did not 
apply strict scrutiny, which would have required "Virginia to demonstrate that the exclusion 
of women is necessary to achieve its compelling interest in having diverse educational 
opportunities for its male citizens"). 
204. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
adopted a least-restrictive-means test because "[t]here is simply no support in our cases for 
the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to characteristics that 
hold true in every instance"); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 203, at 883 ("[B]y requiring VMI 
to make institutional adjustments to admit qualified women, the Court has elevated equal 
protection analysis to the level of the least-restrictive-means analysis of strict scrutiny."); 
Steven A. Delchin, Comment, United States v. Virginia and Our Evolving "Constitution": 
Playing Peek-a-Boo with the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 4 7 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1997) (noting that in contrast to the analysis in Virginia, generally 
"intermediate scrutiny is not governed by a least-restrictive-means analysis or some 'perfect 
fit' paradigm"). But see Mary A. Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1447, 1449 (2000) ("For a sex-respecting rule to withstand constitutional scrutiny by the 
Court, it seems to be at least necessary and usually sufficient that it embody some perfect 
proxy."). 
205. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (concluding that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to 
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 
'narrow tailoring' test"). 
206. The Court's demanding interpretation of intermediate scrutiny in Virginia left many 
confused regarding the meaning and proper application of the intermediate scrutiny standard. 
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 15, at 75 ("After United States v. Virginia, it is not simple to 
describe the appropriate standard of review, States must satisfy a standard somewhere 
between intermediate and strict scrutiny."); Jeffrey A. Barnes, Case Note, The Supreme 
Court's "Exceedingly [Un]persuasive" Application of Intermediate Scrutiny in United States 
v. Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 523 (1997) ("The Court's apparent heightening of the level 
of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications from the previously used intermediate 
scrutiny to an ambiguous standard ... equivalent to strict scrutiny, will further inhibit 
legislatures from classifying or treating individuals differently based upon their gender."); 
Delchin, supra note 204, at 1131, 1134 (arguing that "[t]he statements, formulations, and 
descriptions in the VMI majority opinion may presage the Court's final 'evolution' to strict 
scrutiny for sex-based classifications"); Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver 
Lining: Constructing a Nonremedial yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for Single-Sex 
Educational Programs in Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 375 (2001) ("Although most 
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of the substantial relationship test was appropriate given what 
was at stake in both Virginia and Hogan. In Virginia, women were 
denied access to a premier military institution with a training 
philosophy and methodology that were unparalleled by any other 
university in the Commonwealth.207 Virginia tried to remedy its 
constitutional violation by creating a parallel institution-the 
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin 
College, an all-women's institution.208 However, the Supreme Court 
rejected this remedy as insufficient because VWIL lacked VMI's 
famed adversative method.209 In addition, VWIL and VMI were not 
substantially equal in terms of tangible benefits, such as the 
student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities, nor in the 
intangible benefits ofVMI's long history, including its prestigious 
and extensive alumni network.210 While scholars have noted the 
difficulty in meeting the standard applied in Virginia,211 the Court 
appropriately viewed Virginia's proffered justifications with great 
skepticism and found them lacking because the exclusion of women 
was not necessary to achieve Virginia's educational goals.212 
Similarly, in Hogan, the Court appropriately applied a require-
ment that the sex classification be necessary to achieve the State's 
goal.213 The male applicant could not attend a nursing school 
without driving a considerable distance nor could he obtain credit 
for his degree from on-the-job training, as his female counterparts 
could.214 The Court correctly concluded that this burden should only 
courts since Virginia have applied the exceedingly persuasive justification standard in much 
the same way as they applied intermediate scrutiny, many courts are still unclear as to 
whether Virginia heightened, or simply re-iterated, the standard of review for gender 
classifications." (footnote omitted)). But see Sunstein, supra note 15, at 75 ("The revision of 
the standard of review is unlikely to produce different results from those that would have 
followed under the intermediate scrutiny standard, which has operated quite strictly 'in 
fact."'). 
207. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548-54. 
208. ld. at 546. 
209. ld. at 548-50. 
210. ld. at 546-51. 
211. SeeJOHNE.NOWAK&RONALDD.ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 845 (6thed. 2000); 
Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 813. 
212. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539-40. 
213. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text. 
214. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982); see also YUDOF ET 
AL., supra note 18, at 556 ("For Joe Hogan, the practical consequence of the MUW admissions 
standard was to compel him to choose between his home and vocation."). 
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be placed on the plaintiff in Hogan if the State could not achieve its 
objective through other means.215 
The Court has also held other sex classifications unconstitutional 
because an effective, sex-neutral alternative would serve the state's 
interest, thereby rendering the sex classification unnecessary. For 
example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the Court 
invalidated a statute that provided benefits to widows without 
proof of need, but required widowers to prove dependence or 
incapacitation, because a sex-neutral alternative would have served 
Congress's objective. 216 The availability of either individualized 
determinations or the provision of benefits to all surviving spouses 
rendered the sex classification unnecessary.217 
The Court's application of the substantial relationship test in 
cases such as Virginia and Hogan stands in sharp contrast to the 
Court's less demanding interpretation of the substantial relation-
ship test in other cases, as described next. 
B. The Least Demanding Interpretation of the Substantial 
Relationship Test 
The Court has found some sex classifications to be substantially 
related to the state's objective if the classification merely helps 
the governmental actor achieve its objective, rather than being 
necessary or essential to achieving that objective. For example, the 
Court's 2001 decision in Nguyen v. INS upheld a law that required 
fathers, but not mothers, of children born out of wedlock outside of 
the United States to take one of three steps to establish the child's 
U.S. citizenship.218 The Court allowed a rather loose fit between 
215. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26. This denial is similar in some ways to Missouri's 
unconstitutional attempt to force the petitioner in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada to attend 
a law school for African Americans in a nearby state. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 u.s. 337, 343-44 (1938). 
216. 446 u.s. 142, 151 (1980). 
217. See id. at 151-52; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979) (invalidating a 
requirement that only husbands must pay alimony because the state provided for 
individualized hearings to determine need, and thus, a gender-neutral classification served 
the state's interest); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (invalidating a 
"gratuitous" gender-based distinction because "without it, the statutory scheme would only 
provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated to the women the statute 
aids"). 
218. 533 u.s. 53, 62, 73 (2001). 
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means and ends, as Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent.219 For 
example, the Court in Nguyen acknowledged, and then dismissed 
out of hand, the sex-neutral alternatives available to Congress to 
ensure that a child born out of wedlock and its citizen parent had a 
demonstrated opportunity to develop a relationship between the 
United States, the child, and the citizen parent.220 Therefore, the sex 
classification certainly was not necessary to achieve the govern-
ment's objective. 
Furthermore, the Court has often permitted a loose fit between 
means and ends when it has shifted its focus from whether the 
classification will achieve its objective most of the time, as it 
permitted in Nguyen,221 to whether it will achieve its objective in 
virtually every instance, as the Court required in Virginia. 222 The 
Court in Nguyen stated that "[n]one of our gender-based classifica-
tion equal protection cases have required that the statute under 
consideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate objective in 
every instance. "223 The Court thereby accepted the classification's 
inability to serve the intended purpose in some instances, and thus 
indicated its approval of a rather imperfect fit between the classifi-
cation and the objective. In contrast, the Court in Virginia did not 
focus on the needs of most women, as it assumed that most women 
would not want to attend VMI.224 Instead, the Court focused on 
whether VMI could deny admission to those women "who have the 
will and capacity" to satisfy VMI's rigorous requirements.225 By 
focusing on these women, the Court required the classification to 
serve its objective in virtually every instance.226 
A similarly imprecise fit between means and ends was upheld in 
Kahn v. Shevin, in which the Court upheld a $500 property tax 
219. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
did not require a sufficiently tight fit between means and ends). 
220. See id. at 69 (noting that Congress could have required an actual relationship between 
the child and the citizen parent or exempted from the statutory requirements the parent and 
child who had an established relationship). 
221. Id. at 70. 
222. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996). 
223. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70. 
224. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542. 
225. Id. 
226. This requirement prompted Justice Scalia's dissenting comment that "[t]here is simply 
no support in our cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates 
to characteristics that hold true in every instance." Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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benefit for widows, but not for widowers.227 The Court claimed that 
the question was not whether the "[l)egislature could have drafted 
the statute differently, so that its purpose would have been 
accomplished more precisely."228 Instead, the Court alleged that the 
State was not required to draw precise lines for taxation schemes. 229 
However, the imprecision of the admissions policy in Virginia, as 
demonstrated by its exclusion of those women who could succeed at 
VMI, contributed to its invalidation.23° Furthermore, the sex-neutral 
alternatives available to address the problem in Kahn, such as the 
.inclusion of a financial means test that would exclude those widows 
who did not need the tax exemption,231 also establishes that the sex 
classification was not essential to achieving the State's objective. 
The Court also placed its imprimatur on a loose fit between 
means and ends in Rostker v. Goldberg, in which it upheld a male-
only draft registration because only men were permitted to serve in 
combat, and the purpose of registration was to develop a pool of 
individuals who could serve as combat troops.232 Even if the Court 
believed that deference to the military in determining that women 
could not serve in combat was appropriate,233 combat-ineligible 
men were required to register as well,234 disproving that combat 
eligibility was essential for an individual to be included in the draft. 
Furthermore, the military includes countless noncombat positions 
227. 416 u.s. 351, 352, 355-56 (1974). 
228. Id. at 356 n.10. 
229. See id. at 355, 356 n.10. 
230. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42. 
231. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that a "financially 
independent heiress" would qualify for the exemption and that the State had not explained 
"why inclusion of widows of substantial economic means was necessary to advance the State's 
interest in ameliorating the effects of past economic discrimination against women"). 
232. 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981). Although some have argued that the Court did not state the 
intermediate scrutiny standard in Rostker, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 727, the 
Court cited cases such as Craig v. Boren in reaching this decision and thereby made clear that 
it applied intermediate scrutiny in Rostker. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79. 
233. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 735 & n.101 ("Of course, the assumption that women 
cannot serve in combat is itself open to serious question and can be challenged as being based 
in stereotypes."); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism, in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 530 (John H. Garvey 
& T. Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 3d ed. 1994) (noting that some feminists felt that arguing for 
the unconstitutionality of a male-only draft was important, while others felt that this position 
would betray women and support what is "least acceptable about the male world"). 
234. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1573 (2d ed. 1988). 
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for which women could be drafted.235 Therefore, the distinction 
between men and women in registration certainly was not necessary 
to achieve the government's interest in raising troops for combat, 
despite the Court's holding that the classification was "closely 
related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration."236 Not 
surprisingly, the tenuous fit between the purpose of registration and 
the exclusion of women from registration that the Court approved 
inRostker provoked substantial criticism237 and vigorous dissents.238 
Although some contend that this decision has been dismissed as 
limited in application because of the Court's special deference in 
military cases,239 the Court undoubtedly permitted a much looser fit 
between the sex classification and its objective than was required in 
either Virginia or Hogan. 240 
Undoubtedly, many of the Court's opinions exist between these 
two extremes. For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Court rejected a 
sex-age differential for the sale of beer because the State failed to 
present evidence that sex represented a "legitimate, accurate 
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."241 Even if the 
State could have demonstrated a closer correlation between the 
age-sex differential and its laws regulating drinking, a sex 
classification would not be necessary to address traffic safety 
because a law prohibiting both sexes from drinking until a certain 
age would address the State's concerns just as effectively. The 
Court's examination of the State's evidence on the age-sex differen-
tial suggests that it would have found the sex classification 
acceptable if the "gender-based distinction closely serve[d] to 
235. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
236. !d. at 79 (majority opinion). 
237. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1572-74; Williams, supra note 233, at 531. 
238. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court today places its 
imprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of 'ancient canards about 
the proper role of women.'"); id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) ("I perceive little, if any, 
indication that Congress itself concluded that every position in the military, no matter how 
far removed from combat, must be filled with combat-ready men. Common sense and 
experience in recent wars, where women volunteers were employed in substantial numbers, 
belie this view of reality."). 
239. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1573. 
240. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 
Rostker as one of several cases in which the Court permitted a looser fit than required in 
Virginia). 
241. 429 u.s. 190, 204 (1976). 
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achieve that objective,"242 rather than only permitting the classifica-
tion if it was necessary to achieve the objective. 
The disparate interpretations of intermediate scrutiny render it 
ineffective as a constitutional framework because its requirements 
have become unreliable and inconsistent. Determining what 
constitutes a substantial relationship between a classification and 
an objective invites a wide variety of opinions. Justice Rehnquist 
correctly foreshadowed these concerns with intermediate scrutiny 
in Craig v. Boren, in which he criticized the majority for adopting it 
by asking: "How is [the Court] to determine whether a particular 
law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of [its] ... objective, 
rather than related in some other way to its achievement?"243 He 
wisely argued that the "phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic 
as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to 
particular types of legislation."244 Unlike strict scrutiny, under 
which very little is upheld, and rational basis, under which most 
things pass constitutional muster, 245 intermediate scrutiny currently 
is sufficiently indeterminate that the only thing consistent about it 
is that it is inconsistently interpreted and applied.246 
Intermediate scrutiny's indeterminacy has also been repeatedly 
acknowledged by scholars, who contend that it represents no more 
than "ad hoc judgments based upon Justices' perceptions of the 
gender classification at issue in each case."247 Kathleen Sullivan 
colorfully captures intermediate scrutiny's indeterminacy in this 
way: "No amount ofbureaucratic lingo in the formulas ofintermedi-
242. I d. at 200. 
243. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. 
245. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S 
THIRD CENTURY 292 (2d ed. 1998). 
246. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 647 ("[l)t is argued that in some cases 
intermediate scrutiny is applied in a very deferential manner that is essentially rational basis 
review, while in other cases intermediate scrutiny seems indistinguishable from strict 
scrutiny."). 
24 7. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834; see George C. ffiavac, Interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1375 
( 1993) ("The intermediate-scrutiny test ... is a much more malleable test that permits judges' 
subjective preferences to come into play."); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: 
Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 325 (1998) ("[T)he 
Court's use of intermediate scrutiny makes it vulnerable to charges of ad hoc 
decisionmaking. "). 
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ate scrutiny ... can wholly dispel that Lochnerian feeling one can get 
from intermediate scrutiny's shifting bottom line."248 The indetermi-
nacy and subjectivity of intermediate scrutiny is reflected in the 
wide spectrum of criticisms of this standard. Although some 
constitutional frameworks are consistently criticized as too strict or 
too lenient, intermediate scrutiny is criticized for being both. On the 
one hand, some contend that intermediate scrutiny is a rather 
permissive standard that is no different than rational basis 
review;249 on the other hand, some contend that the Court has 
applied intermediate scrutiny in ways that make it virtually 
indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.250 Thus, while the Supreme 
Court has been applying intermediate scrutiny for more than thirty 
years, "the Court has always been much less clear about what that 
standard allows and what it prohibits."251 
C. The Implications of the Court's Disparate Interpretations of 
Intermediate Scrutiny for Single-Sex Public Schools 
The indeterminacy of intermediate scrutiny could result in 
several potential negative outcomes for single-sex public schools. 
Courts considering the range of interpretations of the substantial 
relationship test could apply different requirements for how tight 
the means and ends must be when deciding the constitutionality of 
single-sex schools, and thus reach different outcomes on the 
constitutionality of similar single-sex schools. 252 The disparate 
interpretations of intermediate scrutiny could also result in courts 
248. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 301 (1992). 
249. See Deutsch, supra note 175, at 221; Hlavac, supra note 247, at 1376. 
250. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict 
Scrutiny to Gender Classifications, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 957-58 (1996); Sunstein, 
supra note 15, at 75. 
251. Hasday, supra note 161, at 756; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834 
(arguing that "the meaning of this test is less than clear"). 
252. For example, courts could reach different outcomes in adjudicating the 
constitutionality of single-sex schools because, while a solitary single-sex school may serve the 
needs and interests of most members of one sex, many students of the other sex may share 
those same needs and interests. Under Virginia and Hogan, the needs and interests of the 
excluded sex would trump the needs and interests ofthe majority, while under Nguyen, Kahn, 
and Rostker the classification's inability to serve its objective all of the time would not be 
dispositive. 
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adopting either a too demanding or too permissive interpretation of 
intermediate scrutiny for single-sex schools. If courts applied the 
most demanding interpretation of intermediate scrutiny from 
Virginia to all single-sex schools, courts could chill the development 
of single-sex schools because establishing that single-sex education 
is necessary to improve student outcomes would be difficult.253 This 
would be undesirable, given the considerable success of some single-
sex schools254 and the need for educational reforms.255 
Alternatively, a very permissive interpretation of intermediate 
scrutiny would fail to identify the potential harms that could exist 
in a single-sex school, just as lower courts applying intermediate 
scrutiny have sometimes failed to emphasize sufficiently the 
substantial harms of sex discrimination.256 The indeterminate 
nature of intermediate scrutiny leaves courts "a lot more room to 
import their own prejudices and biases in determining the existence 
of a relationship and the importance of the state interest 
involved."257 A permissive standard may also not require a suffi-
ciently persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one 
sex, thereby permitting educators to focus on one sex while neglect-
ing the needs of the other with impunity. 
The possible application of disparate interpretations may also 
discourage experimentation with single-sex schools, as educators 
remain in the dark about their constitutional obligations for opening 
such schools. 258 Few school districts may be willing to undertake the 
253. If this were to occur, Justice Scalia's prediction that the Court's opinion in Virginia 
left no constitutional room for such schools would be proven correct. See United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
254. See supra notes 127-32, 136-38, 145-46 and accompanying text. 
255. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEp'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW AND INVENTORY 
OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/ 
pass2005/2003020.pdf (discussing the events that have highlighted the need for education 
reform within the United States). 
256. See Elizabeth Schneider, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Panel Discussion at 
the Washington College of Law of American University (Apr. 8, 1996), in Centennial Panel: 
Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 24 (1997) [hereinafter Centennial Panel]. 
257. Deborah Brake, Senior Counsel, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Panel Discussion at the 
Washington College of Law of American University (Apr. 8, 1996), in Centennial Panel, supra 
note 256, at 22. 
258. See Brake, supra note 250, at 958; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76; Wexler, supra note 
247, at 325, 341. 
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risks of litigation involved in opening a single-sex school.259 The 
small (but growing) number of single-sex schools may reflect the 
ambiguity of legal obligations in this area, rather than a lack of 
demand for such schools. 
These concerns demonstrate that intermediate scrutiny's current 
formulation is inadequate to achieve optimal results for single-sex 
public schools. Before presenting a proposal to address these 
concerns, this Article examines how other scholars have proposed 
applying the Constitution to single-sex public schools. Their 
theories, and why those theories alone are unpersuasive or insuffi-
cient to address these concerns, are presented in the next Part. 
Ill. SCHOLARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
AND WHY THEY SHOULD BE REJECTED IN THEIR CURRENT 
FORMULATIONS TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SINGLE-SEX PuBLIC SCHOOLS 
Scholars typically tum to two sex equity theories when assessing 
whether single-sex public elementary and secondary schools are 
constitutional: formal equality and antisubordination.260 This Part 
identifies some of the weaknesses of these two theories and argues 
that they should not be used to determine the constitutionality of 
single-sex public schools. 
259. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 597 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 
costs of litigating the constitutionality of a single-sex education program, and the risks of 
ultimately losing that litigation, are simply too high to be embraced by public officials."); Tod 
Christopher Gurney, Comment, The Aftermath of the Virginia Military Institute Decision: Will 
Single-Gender Education Survive?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1183, 1221-22 (1998) (arguing 
that in Virginia, the Court "failed to answer important questions which need to be answered 
in order to give school officials guidance when implementing single-gender schools"). 
260. See Minow, supra note 1, at 818 (noting that the debates over single-sex schools 
"reflect the debates over whether gender equality calls for treating males and females the 
same, or instead attending to differences between them"). No single article can address every 
theory presented in the existing literature on single-sex schools. In addition, some of the 
articles defy existing categories. This Article seeks to address the two most common theories 
underlying scholarship about the constitutionality of single-sex schools and explain why these 
theories are ineffective approaches to single-sex public schools. 
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A. Formal Equality 
The theory of formal equality requires similar treatment for 
similarly situated individuals.261 In applying formal equality to 
single-sex public schools, some argue that single-sex schools are 
unconstitutional because they are inherently unequal.262 Often, 
these arguments focus on the history of sex-segregated schools in 
the United States, arguing, for example, that "in United States 
education, separate has never been equal. From the first Public-
Free Schools to the Citadel, single-sex male schools have had more 
money, more resources and more status than single-sex female 
schools."263 Others contend that single-sex schools are unconstitu-
tional under the standard announced in Virginia because single-sex 
educational environments perpetuate sex-based stereotypes and 
roles, and "can reinforce antagonistic feelings toward the opposite 
sex."264 These arguments reflect a formal equality model because 
equality of the sexes, in terms of opportunities and the roles that 
students occupy, remains the central litmus test for the constitu-
tionality of single-sex schools. 265 
Although some who would hold single-sex public schools unconsti-
tutional rely on a formal equality model, many who believe that 
some room remains for constitutional single-sex schools also 
embrace this model. For instance, some scholars contend that two 
equal single-sex schools, one for each sex, will be required or will 
easily be upheld as constitutional.266 Although this view lacks 
261. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI' ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRlNE, 
COMMENTARY 117 (3d ed. 2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to 
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 588 (1983). Depending on the theory's formulation, 
it may require similar treatment between individuals or groups. See BARTLETI ET AL., supra, 
at 117. 
262. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 2; Johnson, supra note 79, at 88; Lucille M. Ponte, 
United States v. Virginia: Reinforcing Archaic Stereotypes About Women in the Military Under 
the Flawed Guise of Educational Diversity, 7 HAsTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 68 (1996). 
263. Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 309 (footnote omitted); see also Levit, supra note 
60, at 526 ("At this juncture, state-sponsored sex exclusivity is unlikely to vest segregation 
with new meaning. Sex segregation with connotations of inequality is of too recent 
vintage-indeed, it never left us."). 
264. Levit, supra note 60, at 521; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 87. 
265. See BARTLETI' ET AL., supra note 261, at 117. 
266. See Michael Heise, Are Single-Sex Schools Inherently Unequal?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
1219, 1244 (2004); William Henry Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of 
Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL 'y 27, 49 (1997); Gary J. Simson, 
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precedential value, some support for it is found in the Supreme 
Court's equally divided decision in 1977 in Vorchheimer v. School 
District of Philadelphia, which affirmed without an opinion a 
decision that upheld the constitutionality of two comparable single-
sex high schools at which attendance was voluntary in a district of 
coeducational schools.267 
Examination of each of these formal equality arguments reveals 
substantial weaknesses. Although some contend that single-sex 
schools are inherently unequal, promote stereotyping, and reinforce 
antagonistic feelings between the sexes, coeducation also does not 
necessarily ensure equal opportunity for both sexes or prevent the 
stereotyping of either sex.268 Research reveals that both single-sex 
and coeducational schools can stereotype women or promote their 
inferiority.269 The history of coeducational and single-sex schools 
demonstrates that "[s]ome of the same mechanisms of inferiority 
can function in both sex-segregated and coeducational public 
schools."27° For example, both coeducational schools and sex-
segregated schools historically steered women toward marriage and 
motherhood, or toward low-paying jobs that limited their employ-
ment opportunities. 271 In fact, "the history of coeducational public 
education vividly illustrates that this kind of role confinement can 
flourish even in schools where female and male students officially 
have access to the same resources and the same curriculum. "272 
The history of education in this country suggests that how the 
school is operated, rather than the sex of the students, determines 
whether a single-sex or coeducational school reinforces stereotypes 
or subordinates women. 273 Indeed, "the historical record reveals that 
Separate but Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELLL. REV. 443,451 (2005); Tara Boland, 
Comment, Single-Sex Public Education: Equality Versus Choice, 1 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 154, 171 
(1998). 
267. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an 
equally divided court per curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). As an opinion by an equally divided 
court, this opinion lacks precedential value. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,263-
64 (1960). 
268. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 758. 
269. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70, at 3; Hasday, supra note 161, at 758. 
270. Hasday, supra note 161, at 758. 
271. See id. at 793. 
272. ld. at 794. 
273. See Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 305 ("[T]he issue of gender difference in 
learning outcomes appears more as a question of classroom treatments and teacher expertise 
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differences of form like that between sex-segregated and 
coeducational public education can actually prove relatively 
unimportant in terms of their substantive impact on women's 
status."274 Research on single-sex public schools in the last decade 
confirms the historical experience that the operation of the school, 
not the sex of the students, determines how both sexes are 
treated.275 For instance, the 2001 California pilot study of public 
single-sex academies quotes one expert as saying that "[s]ex 
segregated education can be used for emancipation or oppression. As 
a method, it does not guarantee an outcome. The intentions, the 
understanding of people and their gender, the pedagogical attitudes 
and practices, are crucial, as in all pedagogical work."276 Therefore, 
in either a single-sex or coeducational environment, the risk of 
stereotyping exists. 
Because pedagogical attitudes and practices within a school shape 
its outcomes, single-sex public schools that adopt a comprehensive 
approach to gender equity that includes efforts to uncover and 
debunk stereotyping, and to encourage positive perceptions about 
the excluded sex, should be able to effectively address the inequality 
and stereotyping that exists in some single-sex schools.277 Similarly, 
the suggestion that sex segregation reinforces negative feelings 
between the sexes, as evidenced in part by negative comments about 
the excluded sex by single-sex students,278 can also be addressed 
than of school gender context per se." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (footnote omitted)); Haag, supra note 79, at 648 ("The structure of single-sex 
education, in other words, does not in and of itself ensure any particular outcomes, positive 
or negative, because it has multiple inspirations and forms."); Morgan, supra note 178, at 98-
101 (arguing that single-sex schools are not inherently inferior and that the school's context 
and operation must be examined to determine if it maintains the "dominance of a relatively 
empowered group over a relatively subordinated group"). 
274. Hasday, supra note 161, at 794. 
275. A 2002 book that includes a review of single-sex research by many experts in the field 
concludes that, "perhaps most important, many of the authors find that both single-sex and 
coeducational schooling can provide possibilities or constraints to students' achievement or 
future opportunities, and these outcomes depend to a great degree on how these forms of 
schooling are implemented." Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 7. 
276. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 7 4; see also Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 
7 ("[N]umerous studies reported in this volume find that a commitment to gender equity must 
be explicit in an organization's practices for it to be realized."). 
277. See DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 73-76 (recommending that single-sex schools 
develop a strong theory of gender equity in their schools and work to dismantle stereotypes). 
278. See Levit, supra note 60, at 521. 
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through thoughtful pedagogical approaches that encourage 
cooperation and respect, rather than antagonism, between the 
sexes. Although one alternative to attempting to address these 
concerns is to prohibit all single-sex public schools, that approach 
would eliminate a potentially successful avenue for meeting the 
educational needs of students. The wiser approach recognizes that, 
on balance, the potential benefits of single-sex public schools 
outweigh these concerns when single-sex schools are subject to a 
constitutional standard that appropriately addresses the potential 
harms that such schools may generate. 
Having responded to those who would rely on a formal equality 
model to prohibit all single-sex schools, the question remains 
whether a formal equality model should be adopted under which 
only two substantially equal single-sex public schools for each sex 
should be permitted, and all disparities in single-sex schools would 
be forbidden. The answer is that this approach would be too 
restrictive to reach optimal results for single-sex schools.279 AB 
discussed further in Part IV.C, girls and boys have more similarities 
than differences; however, this does not mean that all disparate 
treatment in single-sex schools should be prohibited. Intermediate 
scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools should leave room 
for the development of persuasive research regarding when 
disparate treatment would result in optimal outcomes for single-sex 
public schools.280 
Furthermore, a formal equality theory that only permits two 
substantially equal single-sex schools for each sex could also leave 
in place some aspects of intermediate scrutiny that would under-
mine the development of single-sex public schools. For example, 
courts considering the constitutionality of two single-sex public 
schools would still have to decide whether such schools should be 
permitted only if they are necessary to achieve their important 
government interest, whether such schools only have to help the 
government achieve its interest, or if some standard between these 
two extremes should be applied.281 Two substantially equal single-
279. A formal equality approach under which two substantially equal single-sex schools are 
automatically upheld also should not be adopted because a minimal review of such schools 
could cause courts to overlook stereotyping within these schools. 
280. See infra Part IV.C. 
281. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing the various Supreme Court interpretations of 
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sex schools would also be in constitutional jeopardy if they did not 
produce superior academic or other outcomes when compared to 
coeducational schools with similar students because the Court often 
invalidates sex classifications when a sex-neutral alternative would 
serve the state's interest as well as or better than the sex classifica-
tion.282 Single-sex schools presently appear to operate under the 
shadow of this requirement, as evidenced by Rosemary Salomone's 
research revealing that "[p]ublic pressure constantly weighs on 
these schools to prove that they are academically 'better' than 
coeducational schools serving similar students."283 Therefore, even 
when two equal single-sex schools exist, courts could still require 
these schools to outperform coeducational schools and shut them 
down if they fail to do so. This pressure could have a chilling effect 
on those considering opening such schools. 
The problems that would remain if formal equality were adopted 
as currently formulated and the weaknesses of this approach 
warrant development of an alternative approach to govern the 
constitutionality of single-sex schools. Before turning to the 
approach proposed in this Article, the next section examines the 
argument that the constitutionality of single-sex schools should be 
assessed under an antisubordination theory of gender equity. 
B. Antisubordination 
An antisubordination theory of sex equity explicitly or implicitly 
underlies many arguments both for and against the consti-
tutionality of single-sex public schools. Antisubordination theories 
"makeD the relevant inquiry not whether women are like, or unlike, 
men, but whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate women 
to men. "284 For example, some contend that single-sex schools 
are unconstitutional because they harm girls or women and/or 
perpetuate sex-based stereotypes about girls orwomen.285 Similarly, 
those who would uphold the constitutionality of single-sex schools 
intermediate scrutiny). 
282. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
283. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9. 
284. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 261, at 533. 
285. See Cynthia F. Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in Higher 
Education: VMI and The Citadel, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL 'y 101, 101 (1997). 
2006 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1953 
focus on the benefits of such schools for girls or women, often 
distinguishing the new generation of single-sex schools from 
prior generations.286 These types of arguments rest on an anti-
subordination approach because they consider the harm or benefit 
to girls or women as the central question of their analysis. 
In applying an antisubordination approach, some would uphold 
the constitutionality of a girls' single-sex school when the district 
does not provide a boys' single-sex school but typically would not 
permit a boys' single-sex school without a girls' single-sex school.287 
For example, Sharon Rush argues that "[v]oluntarily created all-
female schools should be constitutional because they promote the 
equal citizenship of women without damaging the equal citizenship 
stature of men."288 In contrast, she argues that "[m]ale-only state 
schools create a hierarchy where men's citizenship stature is valued 
more than women's citizenship rights."289 
Similarly, Denise Morgan argues for an antisubordination 
approach to single-sex public schools.290 She contends that "shifting 
the emphasis of [the intermediate scrutiny] test from fit to anti-
subordination focuses the judicial inquiry on the most important 
question in sex equality jurisprudence: whether government use of 
sex-based classifications works explicitly or implicitly to perpetuate 
the hierarchy of men over women. "291 In applying this analysis, 
Morgan's focus on potential harm to girls leads her to argue that a 
boy denied admission to a single-sex school such as YWLS would not 
have suffered a constitutional violation, and that "if none of the 
other small high-quality co-educational middle schools in the school 
district catered to his particular interests and needs, he and his 
parents should work to convince other parents and teachers in the 
school district to set up a school that does."292 However, she also 
allows a single-sex school for boys to be found constitutional if it 
does not adversely affect "the life chances of girls within the 
286. See, e.g., Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Education After VMI: The Case for Women's 
Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 46, 59-62, 76-77 (1998). 
287. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 759, 808-09; Nemko, supra note 286, at 67. 
288. Rush, supra note 203, at 57-58. 
289. Id. at 55. 
290. Morgan, supra note 1, at 459. 
291. Id. 
292. Morgan, supra note 178, at 121. 
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community."293 Others also support an antisubordination approach, 
but for different reasons.294 
Scholars have pointed to statements by the Court that arguably 
support the antisubordination approach. 295 An antisubordination 
approach is consistent with some of the Court's existing case law 
because it allows sex classifications to remedy harm to women.296 
Nevertheless, except when the Court finds that a sex classification 
is addressing past discrimination, the Court is unlikely to adopt an 
antisubordination approach because it has repeatedly eschewed 
such asymmetrical approaches. The Court has required state actors 
to "not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females. "297 Indeed, men who 
sought the treatment or benefit accorded to women have brought 
many of the Court's successful equal protection cases.298 Ai3 this 
Article seeks to propose an approach that the Court should adopt, 
the unlikelihood that the Supreme Court would adopt an anti-
subordination approach is one strike against that approach. 
Moreover, although the antisubordination approach advanced by 
scholars such as Denise Morgan is among the more sophisticated 
293. Morgan, supra note 1, at 457. 
294. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 861-62, 869 (arguing that a rational relationship 
test should apply to single-sex charter schools for minorities and girls, but a more demanding 
standard should apply to single-sex schools for white boys, given the history of male 
domination and white resistance to integrated schools); Hasday, supra note 161, at 756 
(arguing that "the historical record of a practice can inform an investigation into whether, 
when, and why that practice is consistent with women's 'full citizenship stature' or operates 
to perpetuate their 'legal, social, and economic inferiority'"). 
295. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 756; Morgan, supra note 1, at 384. 
296. The Court has repeatedly recognized this country's "long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684 (1973); see also United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). Recognizing this history, the Court has upheld several 
classifications that compensate women for past discrimination when such classifications could 
not be adopted to benefit men. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-20 (1977) (per 
curiam) ("Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused 
by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as such an important 
governmental objective."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976) (noting that prior 
decisions upheld gender classifications that remedied "disadvantageous conditions suffered 
by women in economic and military life" (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974))); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 731, 735-36; 
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834 (noting that laws favoring women are permitted 
to make up for "past economic discrimination"). 
297. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added). 
298. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979). 
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and persuasive approaches to assessing the constitutionality of 
single-sex public schools, the Court, even if it were willing to adopt 
this approach, would be ill-advised to do so for several reasons. The 
primary reason is that the theory would not effectively address the 
modern gender equity concerns facing our schools. It is undeniable 
that intermediate scrutiny was adopted to address this country's 
history of pernicious discrimination against women299 and that the 
United States still has a substantial distance to go to overcome that 
history.300 Nevertheless, the present-day differences in achievement 
outcomes for girls and boys that are described in Part I.A present a 
complex picture that does not consistently favor either sex, and thus 
defies categorical treatment, including categorical treatment that 
focuses primarily on girls' educational needs.301 
The achievement data is clear-neither sex is ahead on all 
measures and, along with lingering areas in which girls lag behind 
boys, boys lag behind girls in several critical areas, such as 
reading, writing, and college graduation rates.302 Similarly, both 
sexes may also experience adverse treatment, but in different 
ways. 303 Undoubtedly, "[s]hort-term test scores and even longer term 
college admissions may not capture what equality in education 
should mean. "304 Yet, one should also be careful not to embrace a 
constitutional theory that could encourage educators to neglect the 
educational needs of boys when their performance is declining in 
important areas.305 Instead, one should try to make certain that 
constitutional standards help the country ensure that all children 
299. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531. 
300. See, e.g., LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTHABOUTWOMEN AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 407-13 (1996) (summarizing findings of sex discrimination in many 
aspects of the criminal justice system); SADKER & SADKER, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing how 
girls and boys are treated differently in the classroom); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
WOMEN'S EARNINGS: WORK PATTERNS PARTIALLY EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN'S 
AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS 9 (2003) (finding that "[a)fter accounting for factors affecting 
earnings, women earned an average of [eighty) percent of what men eamed in 2000"). 
301. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text. 
304. Minow, supra note 1, at 820. 
305. Some, such as Christina Sommers and Judith Kleinfeld, contend that boys' 
educational needs are not currently being met and are even being neglected. See KLEINFELD, 
supra note 44, at 3-4; SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 14; see also Samuels, supra note 62, at 8. 
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are given opportunities to reach their full intellectual potential.306 
For that reason, the constitutional theory applied to single-sex 
schools should recognize the complexity of modern-day gender 
disparities in education, and thus reject antisubordination's 
exclusive focus on the effect that a single-sex school has on girls. 
Fortunately, education is not a zero-sum game. Both boys and girls 
may be provided single-sex opportunities without undermining the 
opportunities provided to girls.307 
In addition to not effectively addressing modern-day gender 
equity concerns, boys who are denied a single-sex school that is 
provided to girls should not bear the responsibility for organizing 
other students and parents to open a single-sex school because the 
constitutional obligation to provide equal protection of the laws 
rests on the state actor, typically the school district, rather than on 
that state's citizens. The Court made this clear in Virginia when it 
stated that when reviewing a sex classification, "[t]he burden of 
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State."308 The 
antisubordination approach would lift this burden from the state 
and place it on boys' shoulders, thereby placing a heavy burden on 
boys to police their own rights, while the state focuses its energy 
and resources on girls and any harm to them or their status. 
Those who support an antisubordination approach may not be 
concerned about placing such a heavy burden on boys because they 
believe that men continue to hold more power and greater status in 
society, and thus, boys should be able to convince a school board to 
open a boys' school if they would benefit from one.309 However, the 
growing evidence that boys' educational needs are being overlooked 
and that their achievement is laggin~10 suggests that boys in 
elementary and secondary schools may not have the ability to 
306. See Pinzler, supra note 81, at 788. 
307. In addition to its other shortcomings, an antisubordination approach also fails to 
recognize the humanity that boys share with the girls who are the focus of the approach. 
However, "when we fail to 'treat likes alike'-we not only limit individual liberty and destroy 
some social tradition, but we also, in effect, excommunicate: we declare some people to be not 
worthy, and thus not 'like us,' and therefore not 'of us."' RoBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING 
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
150 (2003). Thus, antisubordination's excommunication of boys based on the hierarchy of men 
over women should be avoided whenever possible. 
308. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996) (emphasis added). 
309. See Morgan, supra note 178, at 121. 
310. See supra notes 42-49, 61-67 and accompanying text. 
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protect their interests as the antisubordination approach presumes. 
Boys also sometimes may lack the influence to obtain a single-sex 
school for themselves, and those in power may not be focused on 
their interests. Consider the single-sex schools in New York City as 
one example. Until2004, no boys' schools existed in New York City, 
while the YWLS and its students have thrived since the school 
opened in 1996.311 While New York City now has two boys' schools 
(and five girls' schools), boys' needs in New York City are unlikely 
to be dramatically different now from their needs when YWLS 
opened in 1996, and thus, those boys who would have benefited from 
boys' schools during the interim did not have their needs met. 
Therefore, even though men continue to hold substantially more 
power and influence in American society, boys may sometimes lack 
the ability, resources, or insight into the potential benefits of a 
single-sex school for boys to convince a school board to open a school 
for them, even when one would benefit them.312 
Although antisubordination seems to imply that women's 
interests may not be adequately protected unless they are given 
special solicitude, this may not remain true in many instances.313 In 
the realm of single-sex public schools, girls' interests may be 
adequately championed by groups such as the Young Women's 
Leadership Foundation, which has opened five single-sex schools for 
girls and one for boys, 314 just as others have focused on and opened 
schools for boys.315 In the realm of influence to open single-sex 
schools, neither sex appears to consistently lack the ability to obtain 
311. See supra text accompanying notes 140-46. 
312. The philanthropist and former journalist Ann Rubenstein Tisch initiated plans for the 
YWLS in 1995, but did not open its doors until the fall of 1996. To launch the school, she hired 
a legal team, obtained consulting services, and met with many top education officials and 
parents. See SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 11-12; Riordan, supra note 51, at 24. Undoubtedly, 
such a philanthropist and former journalist will have available more financial resources and 
professional and personal connections to obtain results quickly than will most boys and their 
families inN ew York City. The Court has already established that the rights protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause are "rights which are personal and present." Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if a boy could work to develop such 
a school, the delay in his enjoyment of his rights denies him the equal protection of the laws 
today. 
313. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 245, at 318 (discussing John Hart Ely's argument that 
"women are today more than capable of being heard politically"). 
314. See Barak, supra note 1, at 33. 
315. See Minow, supra note 1, at 817 (discussing how some advocate for girls' schools and 
against boys' schools, while others advocate for boys' schools). 
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a school that will benefit them. However, the excluded sex in 
districts that lack a substantially equal school for their sex may lack 
the means to obtain a school that would benefit them.316 
The proposal presented in the next Part seeks to address the 
shortcomings of the formal equality and antisubordination ap-
proaches.317 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDEPOSTS FOR THE NEW GENERATION OF 
PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
Two factors should serve as guideposts that direct how the 
substantial relationship component of intermediate scrutiny should 
be applied to single-sex public schools: whether attendance is 
voluntary and whether substantially equal opportunities are given 
to both sexes. These two characteristics can be used to divide single-
sex public schools into two categories that present distinct potential 
risks and benefits, and thus warrant different constitutional 
requirements. lfboth voluntary attendance and substantially equal 
opportunities for both sexes are present, schools should be placed 
into the dual, voluntary category. If either voluntary attendance or 
substantially equal opportunities is absent, single-sex schools 
should be placed into the solitary or involuntary category. The 
substantial relationship test should be calibrated to be more 
demanding when assessing solitary or involuntary schools and less 
demanding when assessing dual, voluntary schools. 
This proposal's details are set forth below. Par IV.A sets the stage 
for modifying intermediate scrutiny by analyzing how the Supreme 
Court recently modified its interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in Grutter v. Bollinger. Part IV.B explains why the presence 
of substantially equal opportunities and voluntary attendance 
results in two distinct categories of single-sex public schools that 
represent different potential harms. Part IV.C proposes how these 
two factors should be analyzed and how the substantial relationship 
316. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
317. In taking this position, this Article does not suggest that antisubordination is an 
approach that should not be adopted generally. Instead, this Article argues that 
antisubordination would not result in optimal outcomes if applied to single-sex public schools 
for the reasons outlined in Part III.B. However, an antisubordination approach may produce 
the best possible results in other areas. 
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requirement should be calibrated for each of the two categories of 
schools. Finally, Part IV.D articulates how the deference given to 
the two categories of schools should differ. 
A. The Supreme Court's Modification of Equal Protection in 
Grutter v. Bollinger 
In analyzing the threshold question of whether intermediate 
scrutiny should be modified when applied to single-sex public 
schools, examining how the Supreme Court recently modified its 
equal protection doctrine in Grutter v. Bollinger is helpful. In 
Grutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School's admissions policy that sought to achieve 
diversity by considering an applicant's race as one factor among 
many admission factors. 318 Although the Court required a govern-
ment actor seeking to remedy past discrimination to present 
evidence of discrimination in the geographic area in which the 
remedy is sought,319 the Court in Grutter did not limit its consider-
ation of evidence of the benefits of diversity to what happened at the 
law school. Instead, the Court briefly considered evidence from the 
law school itself and ultimately relied heavily on evidence from 
numerous amici, including General Motors, 3M, and high-ranking 
military officers, who all presented arguments regarding the 
importance of diversity in U.S. businesses and the military.320 This 
modification appropriately customized strict scrutiny's application 
to diversity because the value of diversity is not limited to the 
particular institution before the Court, or even to educational 
institutions generally, but instead extends beyond educational 
institutions to the occupations and society for which students are 
prepared and trained. 321 
318. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
319. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504-05 (1989). 
320. See Grutter, 529 U.S. at 330-31. In Bakke, Justice Powell also relied on evidence from 
Harvard University to establish the nature of diversity that he found sufficiently compelling 
to support consideration of race at the Medical School of the University of California at Davis. 
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,316-17 (1978). 
321. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32; see also Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity 
as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1996) ("[T]he 
Court's present refusal to rely on evidentiary findings drawn from other jurisdictions is 
inappropriate in a case concerning diversity in higher education." (footnote omitted)). 
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The Court also deferred to the law school's educationaljudgments 
in determining whether diversity was a compelling interest. 322 The 
Court explained that this deference was appropriate in light of past 
decisions that gave "deference to a university's academic decisions, 
within constitutionally prescribed limits."323 Such deference is 
noticeably absent from cases in which the Court considered race-
conscious programs adopted by such important representative 
bodies as Congress or state and local legislatures. 324 The Court has 
also modified its constitutional framework in other contexts.325 In 
short, modifying a constitutional standard is permissible and may 
more effectively protect the constitutional rights at stake.326 
B. Constitutional Guideposts that Determine the Nature of the 
Potential Harm Created by Single-Sex Public Schools: Voluntary 
Attendance and Substantially Equal Opportunities for Both Sexes 
The Supreme Court astutely observed in Jenness v. Fortson that 
"[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things 
that are different as though they were exactly alike."327 This 
principle holds true in considering not only how governments should 
treat people, but also how courts and educators should view the 
322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
323. Id. 
324. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 238 (1995); Croson, 488 
U.S. at 498-501. 
325. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1995) (upholding 
suspicionless drug testing of student-athletes against a Fourth Amendment challenge and 
explaining that a public school may exercise considerable control over public schoolchildren 
even though the same degree of control cannot be constitutionally exercised over free adults); 
see also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1346-69 
(2000) (analyzing how the Supreme Court has tailored schoolchildren's constitutional search, 
due process, and speech rights "to fit the school context"). 
326. Some might contend that the Court specifically rejected any modification of 
intermediate scrutiny in Hogan. In that case, Justice O'Connor noted that Justice Powell 
argued in dissent that "a less rigorous test should apply because Hogan does not advance a 
'serious equal protection claim."' Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 
(1982) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting)). The prior discussion of the 
inconsistencies in the Court's intermediate scrutiny cases demonstrates that the Court's 
statement that its analysis of intermediate scrutiny remains the same is inaccurate. See supra 
notes 178-242 and accompanying text. 
327. 403 u.s. 431, 442 (1971). 
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constitutional doctrines and tests that the Court has developed in 
applying the Equal Protection Clause. 328 
As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court systematized its 
application of strict scrutiny in United States v. Paradise, in which 
the Court listed several factors that guide strict scrutiny's narrow 
tailoring inquiry.329 Similarly, this Article seeks to systematize how 
intermediate scrutiny's application of the substantial relationship 
test to single-sex public schools takes "relevant differences into 
account. "330 The proposal in this Article modifies the substantial 
relationship test because the most difficult question in assessing the 
constitutionality of single-sex public schools will depend upon how 
the Court applies the often difficult and opaque substantial 
relationship test. 331 
The substantial relationship component of the intermediate 
scrutiny test represents the most challenging inquiry in any 
analysis of whether a sex classification is constitutional. 332 The 
Court itself has admitted in a plurality opinion that "[t]he question 
whether a statute is substantially related to its asserted goals is at 
best an opaque one. "333 The difficulty of applying the substantial 
relationship test is particularly troubling because the fit between 
means and ends is also the most important distinction between 
intermediate scrutiny and the rational basis standard.334 Therefore, 
328. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."); see also THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: A JOINT STATEMENT OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS 23 (2003) (arguing that differences in the settings and 
interests advanced in elementary and secondary education may "weigh against a reliance on 
Grutter and Gratz [v. Bollinger]" in determining whether other interests should be considered 
sufficiently compelling to support a racial classification). 
329. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (noting that when the Court 
determines if a program is narrowly tailored, the Court examines "several factors"). 
330. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
331. See Willinger, supra note 37, at 277-78 (arguing that while a number of governmental 
interests exist that may be sufficiently important to support single-sex education, the "very 
difficult" question is whether single-sex education is substantially related to achieving those 
interests). But see Morgan, supra note 1, at 418-19 ("The evolution of traditional justifications 
for single-sex education makes it likely that many of the single-sex public schools that have 
been established in recent years will survive the fit element of intermediate scrutiny." 
(footnote omitted)). 
332. See Brake, supra note 257, at 14. 
333. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 474 n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
334. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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a failure to apply this test properly may result in intermediate 
scrutiny failing to protect adequately against sex discrimination by 
not requiring a sufficiently tight fit between means and ends. 
Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools involve two 
unique characteristics that determine the nature of the potential 
harm created by single-sex schools, and these characteristics should 
guide the application of the substantial relationship component of 
intermediate scrutiny. These characteristics not only distinguish 
some single-sex schools from other sex classifications, but their 
presence or absence also affects the risk that single-sex schools will 
harm students, the burden that single-sex schools may impose on 
individuals, and the need for judicial skepticism of single-sex 
schools. Consistent analysis of these factors will appropriately 
calibrate the rigor with which the substantial relationship test is 
applied to the potential harms and risks of single-sex public schools. 
The first factor is whether the school district provides substan-
tially equal opportunities to both sexes. If the district provides such 
opportunities, the absence of a denial of an opportunity or benefit to 
one sex should serve as a guidepost that distinguishes some single-
sex schools from others. In identifying this as an important factor 
that should drive the constitutional analysis of single-sex schools, 
remembering that intermediate scrutiny is designed to review state 
action that grants an opportunity or benefit to only one sex, or that 
imposes a burden on only one sex, is important.335 For example, the 
Court in Virginia stated that "the Court ... has carefully inspected 
official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or 
to men)."336 The Court has explained that it is "[l]egislative classifi-
cations which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender 
335. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (accepting only male students 
at VMI, a state school); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (statute giving 
husband, but not wife, "the unilateral right to dispose of [joint marital property] without his 
spouse's consent"); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980) (statute 
limiting situations in which a husband, but not a wife, may collect death benefits after the 
other spouse's death); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (statute requiring husbands, but 
not wives, to make alimony payments); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204 (1977) 
(considering disparate Social Security survivors' benefits for widows and widowers); Stanton 
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 8 (1975) (statute "specifying for males a greater age of majority than 
it specifies for females"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) (Social 
Security Act provision granting survivors' benefits to a deceased man's wife and children, but 
only to a deceased woman's children). 
336. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added). 
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[that] carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. "337 
Although all single-sex schools classify students on the basis of 
sex, some single-sex schools do not involve the denial of an opportu-
nity or benefit to one sex. Instead, each sex may receive the same or 
substantially equal benefits. This occurs in dual academies that 
provide a single-sex school for each sex with similar curricula, 
teaching methods, materials, and sometimes even the same teachers 
and facilities,338 as well as in some pairs of single-sex schools that 
educators design to provide both sexes similar educational opportu-
nities. 339 In these circumstances, the state has adopted a sex 
classification by separating boys and girls on the basis of sex, but it 
has not denied either sex a benefit or an opportunity. Such a 
separation should remain subject to intermediate scrutiny,340 but 
the absence of a denial of a benefit or opportunity to one sex 
warrants modification of the intermediate scrutiny standard 
because this subset of single-sex schools generally places less of a 
burden on either sex than when one sex is excluded from certain 
benefits. Substantially equal opportunities for each sex reduce the 
likelihood that either sex is harmed because disparate treatment is 
minimized. Minimizing disparate treatment between girls and boys 
is appropriate because girls and boys are typically similarly 
situated. 341 Thus, the provision of substantially equal opportunities 
helps to ensure that educators are not shortchanging the needs of 
either girls or boys, and such single-sex schools should be subject to 
a less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test. 
In contrast, when a student is denied a single-sex school, the 
student will miss out on a benefit that the school would have 
provided her or him. As described in Part I.C, some single-sex public 
schools, such as YWLS in Harlem, which provides its students 
337. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). 
338. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 227-28. 
339. See id. at 228-32 (describing the California pilot study that focused on giving students 
equal resources). 
340. But see Simson, supra note 266, at 451 (arguing that when two coordinate single-sex 
schools are provided, "[a]lthough the state is obviously taking sex into account in establishing 
such schools, it is not treating anyone any better or worse on the basis of sex. No sex 
classification exists, and therefore the higher level of scrutiny triggered by sex classifications 
does not come into play."). 
341. See Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 306-07. 
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"intense and personalized attention," are providing valuable and 
unique opportunities to their students and achieving substantial 
success. 342 Students excluded from these opportunities are being 
denied the potential to reap these important benefits. This denial 
should influence the constitutional analysis of the schools. 
The second factor is whether attendance at a single-sex school is 
voluntary.343 Voluntary schools are less likely to inflict harm on 
students of either sex for two reasons. First, students who do not 
attend the school can obtain substantially equal benefits in a 
coeducational school. Second, students who attend the school are not 
being forced to attend and could entirely avoid the sex classification. 
The choice to attend the school reduces the likelihood that the 
students are harmed by the school because any perceived harm to, 
or inferior opportunities for, students in single-sex schools will 
cause parents and students to select a different school. For this 
choice to be exercised in an informed manner, parents and students 
will have to be given information about their available options, 
including the potential advantages and disadvantages of these 
options. Voluntary attendance should help to assure educators and 
courts that those students who choose to attend the single-sex 
school, rather than a substantially equal coeducational school, 
believe that the school's single-sex composition will help them 
achieve their educational goals.344 Therefore, voluntary attendance 
at a single-sex school accomplishes some of the work that intermedi-
ate scrutiny was created to achieve.345 
342. See supra text accompanying notes 140-46. 
343. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 391 ("Attendance is voluntary at all of these new [single-
sex) schools."). For children in elementary and secondary schools, parents rather than the 
students will typically be exercising the choice. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534-35 (1925) (affirming that the state cannot unreasonably interfere with "the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control"). However, this does not change the fact that those making the decision to attend the 
school could choose otherwise. 
344. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing why some parents chose to send their 
daughters to YWLS). 
345. The ability to exercise a choice to attend a single-sex school should also have a policing 
effect on educators as they design single-sex public schools because parents and students who 
identify any stereotyping or other harmful effects in single-sex schools will decide to attend 
substantially equal coeducational schools. Certainly, parents and students should not be the 
only policing mechanism because they may overlook sex discrimination or share educators' 
stereotypes, or the school's harmful effects may only be evident over time. Thus, voluntary 
single-sex public schools should remain subject to intermediate scrutiny, including an analysis 
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On the other hand, involuntary attendance increases the risk of 
harm to students. When students attend a single-sex school 
involuntarily, the state may be forcing a sex classification on a 
student that the student would rather avoid. In addition, an 
involuntary classification also carries a greater risk of harm 
because it could convey a negative message about the capacity of 
the sex that is educated in the single-sex environment, namely that 
those students can only succeed when the other sex is absent.346 
Therefore, whether attendance at the school is voluntary or 
involuntary should influence the constitutional analysis of single-
sex public schools. 
C. How the Guideposts Should Modify the Substantial 
Relationship Test Applied to Public Single-Sex Elementary and 
Secondary Schools 
Part C first explains how substantial equality and voluntary 
attendance should be analyzed. This Article then uses these 
guideposts to determine how the substantial relationship test 
should be applied to single-sex public schools. 
1. Analyzing Whether a Single-Sex School Provides 
Substantially Equal Opportunities for Girls and Boys and 
Whether Attendance Is Voluntary 
To determine how the substantial relationship component of 
intermediate scrutiny should be applied, a court should first assess 
whether the district provides substantially equal single-sex schools 
to both sexes and whether students attend the schools on a volun-
tary basis.347 The answers to these two questions determine which 
interpretation of the substantial relationship test should be applied. 
Courts should apply a more demanding interpretation of the 
of whether the schools promote stereotyping. However, voluntary attendance should be one 
of the factors that guides the constitutional analysis of single-sex schools. 
346. See Minow, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing that careful attention should be paid to the 
voluntariness of single-sex education because it could "convey assumptions about the 
vulnerability and incapacity of girls to compete fully with boys at least in the world as 
currently constructed"). 
347. If courts adopt this approach, educators would also follow these steps. Because this 
proposal is largely aimed at courts, this Article will speak of courts conducting the analysis. 
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substantial relationship test when a school district provides a 
solitary or involuntary single-sex school. Conversely, courts should 
apply a less demanding interpretation of the substantial relation-
ship test when a school district provides dual, voluntary schools. 
Courts should examine several factors to assess whether public 
single-sex schools offer each sex substantially equal opportunities, 
such as whether the schools serve similar grade levels and geo-
graphic areas. In addition, courts should assess whether the schools 
offer similar opportunities and benefits, such as similar curricula, 
resources, staffs, and teachers.348 The Supreme Court's opinions in 
cases such as United States v. Virginia and Sweatt v. Painter 
provide thorough discussions of what must be equal for two schools 
to be substantially equal.349 For example, in holding that VMI and 
VWIL were not substantially equal, 350 the Court approvingly quoted 
the dissent of Judge Phillips of the Fourth Circuit, who had 
compared VMI and VWIL to a paradigm that he contended "'could 
survive equal protection scrutiny': single-sex schools with 'substan-
tially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, funding, 
physical plant, administration and support services, ... faculty[,] and 
library resources. '"351 
Creating and maintaining substantial equality in both tangible 
and intangible ways may prove difficult for educators. As one 
expert on single-sex schools has noted, "[s]chools differ from each 
other in subtle and not so subtle ways that are not quantifiable, 
from their curriculum to the instructional materials and approaches 
used, to their educational philosophy, academic expectations, 
teacher experience, and overall climate."352 Undoubtedly, the 
substantial equality standard established in Virginia is a difficult 
one; nevertheless, the Court's use of"substantial equality," rather 
348. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276, 11,285 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004) (noting 
items that must be similar for two schools to be considered substantially equal). 
349. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547-51 (1996) (discussing the 
constitutional requirements for an all-female parallel program to an all-male military 
academy and Virginia's failure to meet these requirements); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
633-34 (1950) (finding no substantial equality between the University of Texas Law School 
and the then newly-created Texas State University law school for African Americans). 
350. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554. 
351. I d. at 54 7 n.17 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 
44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)). 
352. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9. 
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than perfect equality, suggests that it will permit limited differences 
to exist between such schools, while still finding them to be 
substantially equal. For example, the Brighter Choice Charter 
Schools in Albany, New York, permit teachers to vary the pace at 
which they teach girls and boys the same curriculum.353 In addition 
to allowing some tangible differences between single-sex schools for 
each sex, courts should also have some tolerance for intangible 
differences that are beyond educators' control, such as the success 
of an alumnus that brings notoriety to a school. A greater harm 
would be inflicted by ending the single-sex policy of one school that 
differs in minor ways from its counterpart than would be gained by 
the students who are denied those intangible benefits.354 
Courts and educators should be mindful not to transform a 
standard that requires substantially equal single-sex schools into 
one that requires identical single-sex schools. Elementary and 
secondary schools typically will have more similarities than the 
postsecondary institutions that the Court has previously compared, 
353. ROSALIND BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SAME DIFFERENCE: How GENDER MYTHS ARE 
HURTING OUR RELATIONSHIPS, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR JOBS 242, 244 (2004) (arguing that 
"single-sex schools may create as many problems as they solve" and that single-sex schools 
may result in an inferior education for girls, reinforce stereotypes, and leave sexism 
unchallenged in boys' schools); see id. at 234. Currently, researchers debate whether biological 
differences exist between the brains of the sexes and whether this impacts learning. Compare 
LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED To KNOW ABOUT 
THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 1-32 (2005) (arguing that significant biological 
differences exist between girls and boys in how their brains and visual systems are organized, 
how they learn, how they hear, and on other measures), and GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, 
at 35-38,44-52 (examining how biological dissimilarities influence learning at the elementary, 
middle school, and high school levels), with BARNETT & RIVERS, supra, at 240 (arguing that 
differences do not exist regarding how the sexes learn and noting that "[w)omen's ways of 
knowing appear to be exactly like men's ways of knowing"). The resolution of this debate, 
including whether this research should or should not influence how single-sex schools are 
structured, is not necessary to advance the legal argument in this Article; therefore, an 
examination of this debate and its ramifications is beyond the scope of this Article. 
354. See Caplice, supra note 99, at 290 ("Single-sex educational environments are a large 
part of educational reforms in urban areas and constitutional stumbling blocks placed in their 
paths could be devastating. Undeniably, the need for successful educational reform at every 
level of schooling is urgent.") Undoubtedly, the intangible and uncontrollable benefits in a 
single-sex school for one sex could become so overwhelming that the schools no longer remain 
substantially equal. For example, unique opportunities, such as the extensive alumni network 
ofthe Philadelphia High School for Girls, see SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 30, could render 
a new boys' high school in Philadelphia inferior to the girls' school. Nevertheless, this Article 
cautions courts against finding inequality too quickly based on disparities that are beyond the 
control of educators. 
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which traditionally develop a unique faculty, reputation, ranking, 
and alumni network. 355 Additionally, two elementary and secondary 
public schools within a school district are more likely to be substan-
tially equal in their curriculum today because the adoption of 
statewide standards in recent years has increased the similarities 
in curricular offerings among schools.356 
A court would then assess whether students attend the single-sex 
school(s) on a voluntary basis.357 Currently, no district exists that 
has only single-sex public schools. However, this alone does not 
ensure that students attend single-sex schools on a voluntary basis. 
Instead, several factors should be evaluated to determine if students 
voluntarily choose to attend a single-sex school. First, if a student 
can only receive the educational curriculum, teaching methods, 
resources, or other important educational benefits at the single-sex 
school, students may have chosen to accept a single-sex environ-
ment to receive the unique educational opportunities, even though 
the single-sex format is less than desirable. 358 For example, if a 
single-sex school has the only specialized math and science or 
foreign culture and language-focused curriculum in the school 
district, a student may prefer a coeducational environment, but may 
355. Most elementary and secondary schools will lack some of the characteristics that 
postsecondary institutions possess, such as extensive alumni networks, research centers, or 
prestige within the community. See Ryan, supra note 325, at 1380. In those instances when 
single-sex schools possess some of these unique characteristics, such as the alumni network 
of the Philadelphia High School for Girls, see SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 30, such benefits 
should be considered when determining if two single-sex schools are substantially equal. 
356. See, e.g., Douglas A. Archbald & Andrew C. Porter, Curriculum Control and Teachers' 
Perceptions of Autonomy and Satisfaction, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL 'y ANALYSIS 21, 21 
(1994) (discussing how the development of statewide standards in the 1980s resulted in 
"unprecedented assertion of state control over school and classroom curriculum decision 
making," including the use of such means as "prescriptive curriculum policy"); Rodney T. 
Ogawa et al., The Substantive and Symbolic Consequences of a District's Standards-Based 
Curriculum, 40 AM. Enuc. RES. J. 147, 157 (2003) (discussing the use of a districtwide 
curriculum). 
357. Scholars and others have recommended that single-sex schools remain voluntary. See 
Morgan, supra note 1, at 427; Pamela J. Smith, Looking Beyond Traditional Educational 
Paradigms: When Old Victims Become New Victimizers, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 170 n.268 
(1999) (discussing Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson's proposal to allow public schools to offer 
voluntary single-sex schools and classrooms); Sax, supra note 22, at 35. 
358. A Third Circuit judge made a similar argument in his dissent from the opinion that 
upheld two single-sex high schools in Philadelphia. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 
880, 889 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), aft'd by an equally divided court per curiam, 
430 u.s. 703 (1977). 
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be unwilling to forego the specialized curriculum to avoid the single-
sex environment. Consequently, at a minimum, for attendance to be 
voluntary, the district must provide a coeducational school that is 
substantially equal to the single-sex school, irrespective of the 
students' sex. 359 
Second, the context in which students and parents exercise choice 
also determines whether attendance is voluntary. Educators, such 
as teachers and administrators, may exert pressure on students and 
parents to attend a single-sex school or fail to provide students and 
parents the opportunity to decline to attend a single-sex school.360 
When students and parents are not provided the opportunity to 
decline to attend a single-sex school, attendance is effectively 
involuntary.361 
Finally, voluntariness often exists along a continuum, rather than 
as a dichotomy. For example, if the district offers a coeducational 
program that is quite similar, but not substantially equal, to a 
single-sex program, attendance at the single-sex school is more 
voluntary than attendance at a single-sex school in which a unique 
program is offered. The substantial degree of voluntariness in 
attending such a single-sex school would entitle the school to be 
evaluated under the less demanding interpretation of the substan-
tial relationship test. 
2. Dual, Voluntary Single-Sex Public Schools 
If a school district offers substantially equal single-sex schools to 
both sexes, and students attend the schools on a voluntary basis, 
courts should apply a less demanding interpretation of the substan-
tial relationship test.362 As noted above, voluntary attendance and 
359. See Willinger, supra note 37, at 277 (noting that students have free choice between 
schools when there are two comparable single-sex schools and a comparable coeducational 
school). 
360. See DATNOWET AL., supra note 100, at 33 (noting that the choice to attend some of the 
single-sex schools in the California pilot student was "not a fully democratic choice for 
students and parents"). 
361. See Justin Blum, Scores Soar at D. C. School with Same-Sex Classes, WASH. POST, June 
27, 2002, at A1 (noting that in Washington, D.C., an elementary school split all of the classes 
up by sex without informing the superintendent or anyone else). Courts should also be 
mindful that involuntary assignment of students to single-sex schools violates the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (2000). 
362. Cf Minow, supra note 1, at 822 ("Thus, single-sex education could be far more 
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the provision of substantially equal opportunities for both sexes 
likely renders the schools less harmful than other schools, and thus, 
they should be subject to a less demanding constitutional threshold. 
A district that offers dual, voluntary schools should have to 
establish that the single-sex nature of the schools helps the district 
achieve its educational goals. 363 
The district also should be required to establish that dual, 
voluntary single-sex schools are as effective as similarly situated 
coeducational schools364 in achieving their objectives, after educators 
are permitted a reasonable timeframe for understanding how best 
to administer such schools. 365 When examining the outcomes of 
single-sex schools,366 courts should consider a variety of outcomes, 
such as test scores, graduation rates, the attitudes of students 
toward their studies, and students' career prospects. The Court in 
Grutter recognized a variety of student learning outcomes as 
important to its approval of the race-conscious admissions program 
at the University of Michigan Law School, including upholding the 
lower court's findings that the policy "promotes 'cross-racial under-
standing,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables 
[students] to better understand persons of different races.'"367 The 
Court should follow a similar course in its approach to single-sex 
schools by acknowledging that student learning may be improved in 
a variety of ways in single-sex schools, such as by reducing the 
defensible where offered on an entirely voluntary basis than where it is mandated by law. If 
available on an entirely voluntary basis, single-sex education could well convey the social 
message of expected excellence and invitation to full striving."). 
363. See supra notes 218-40 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Court 
adopts this interpretation of the substantial relationship component of intermediate scrutiny). 
364. When measuring the performance of dual, voluntary single-sex schools, or a solitary 
or involuntary school, it is important that courts compare similarly situated schools. If single-
sex schools accept students that were the lowest performers at coeducational schools, courts 
should recognize that this difference will affect the academic and other outcomes that occur 
at such schools. 
365. Courts should permit educators a reasonable amount of time to determine how best 
to administer single-sex public schools because single-sex public schools are relatively new 
to the educational landscape, and educators will need time to understand how to harness the 
benefits of the single-sex environment. 
366. This examination ofthe outcomes from public single-sex schools agrees with Rosemary 
Salomone's contention that the "'exceedingly persuasive justification' ... implicitly requires not 
only a rationale based on students' needs but also some confirmation on the outputs end." 
SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 188. 
367. See Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (alteration in original). 
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perception that girls do not excel at math or that boys do not excel 
at foreign languages, and that these benefits are also important for 
the country's schoolchildren.368 
The requirement that single-sex schools should be as effective as 
similarly situated coeducational schools in achieving their objectives 
recognizes that any important objective for a single-sex school would 
involve benefiting the students attending the school. Therefore, 
evidence that the school is adversely affecting student outcomes 
would undermine an argument that the school's existence is 
substantially related to its objective ofbenefittng students. If single-
sex schools are harming students, the costs of single-sex schools 
become too great. 369 
Some have suggested that single-sex schools must outperform 
coeducational schools to be constitutional-that is, they must 
produce superior academic or other outcomes.370 Indeed, as noted 
above, public pressure on single-sex schools to prove that they are 
more effective than coeducational schools371 may reflect the 
Court's presumption against sex classifications when other sex-
neutral alternatives are available. 372 In light of this presumption, 
courts applying intermediate scrutiny to single-sex public schools 
understandably could require single-sex schools to outperform 
coeducational schools. However, if courts rendered single-sex schools 
unconstitutional because coeducational schools would also serve the 
school district's objective, courts would undermine the ability of 
educators to experiment with single-sex schools, denying school-
children the substantial benefits of some single-sex public schools.373 
A legal requirement that single-sex schools must outperform 
368. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (discussing some of the benefits of 
single-sex schools). 
369. When applying this requirement, it is important to remember that those single-sex 
schools that are developed to promote a diversity of educational options may have inferior 
outcomes while still fulfilling their objective of giving students a choice in where they attend 
school. Similarly, an educational experiment may be more likely to experience inferior 
outcomes than single-sex schools that have been in operation for several years because 
educators may need time to understand how to maximize the benefits of the single-sex 
environment. 
370. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 1, at 456. 
371. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9. 
372. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
373. See supra notes 82-97, 127-32, 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing the research 
on the benefits of single-sex schools and the success of some single-sex schools). 
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coeducational schools would also eliminate the ability of parents and 
students to choose the school that they believe will best serve their 
needs.374 
Applying a less demanding interpretation of the substantial 
relationship test to dual, voluntary schools does not remove these 
schools from constitutional scrutiny. In addition to requiring a 
school district to show that the single-sex nature of the schools helps 
the district achieve its educational goals and that the schools are as 
effective as coeducational schools, all single-sex schools should be 
examined to determine if they are perpetuating stereotypes or the 
inferiority of either sex.375 The examination of dual, voluntary 
schools for stereotyping recognizes that all sex classifications carry 
the risk that the state's effort to develop educational programs has 
relied on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females. "376 Stereotypes 
harm both sexes377 and may be based on mistaken assumptions 
about those excluded from a school, such as the stereotypes about 
women that led VMI to exclude them378 or assumptions about those 
included in the school, such as the exclusion of men from MUW that 
perpetuated the view that the nursing profession was solely for 
women.379 
374. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 244. 
375. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 808-09; Morgan, supra note 1, at 456-57 (arguing that 
the all-male school proposed by the Detroit Board of Education was unconstitutional because 
it perpetuated stereotypes about the place that men should occupy in society). 
376. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
377. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147, 150-52 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 
u.s. 268, 281-83 (1979). 
378. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540-45. 
379. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982). In fact, the burden 
on the sex included in a single-sex school could be so great that the school could be found 
unconstitutional based on the potential harm to the included sex alone, even when no member 
of the excluded sex alleged harm from the school. For example, vocational education had been 
an area in which sex stereotyping was particularly rampant when Title IX was passed and 
in which discrimination continues today. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAw CTR., TITLE IX AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY IN VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION: A PROMISE STILL OWED TO THE 
NATION'S YOUNG WOMEN 3 (2002); Carolyn E. Staton, Sex Discrimination in Public Education, 
58 Miss. L.J. 323, 333 (1988). Therefore, even if Title IX did not forbid single-sex vocational 
schools, a court could invalidate a single-sex vocational school because the risk of stereotyping 
in such schools may be so high that such schools should not be permitted in light of the 
continued sex-based disparities and discrimination in educational opportunities in this area. 
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(l) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in admissions 
to vocational education programs). 
2026 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1953 
By recommending that courts examine all single-sex schools to 
determine if they perpetuate stereotypes, the proposal advanced in 
this Article recognizes that the risk of stereotyping remains real 
today. The stereotyping described in Part I.C, which was uncovered 
in the California schools that were carefully structured to provide 
the same educational programs to boys and girls,380 reveals that 
providing similar resources or benefits to both sexes is no guarantee 
that stereotyping will not exist. Jill Hasday astutely argues in her 
article on single-sex schools that courts should make a thorough 
"particularized investigation" of the operation of "separate but 
equal" single-sex schools to determine whether they deny equal 
citizenship status, rather than assuming that separate but equal 
schools automatically satisfy a school district's obligation to provide 
equal protection of the laws.381 It is doubtful that anyone would 
contend that the perpetuation of stereotypes is substantially related 
to the achievement of an important state objective. 382 Hence, careful 
attention and monitoring will be necessary to avoid stereotyping in 
all single-sex schools. 383 
3. Solitary or Involuntary Single-Sex Public Schools 
A solitary or involuntary single-sex school should be subject to a 
more demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test 
than should a dual, voluntary school because involuntary atten-
dance or the denial of a single-sex school to one sex increases the 
risk of harm to students, as noted in Part N.B. Given the potential 
harms and burdens on students from solitary or involuntary single-
380. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. 
381. Hasday, supra note 161, at 808-09. 
382. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) ("It is unlikely ... that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive 
heightened scrutiny .... "). 
383. The authors of the study of California's pilot program on single-sex schools 
recommended a number of actions that educators could take to address stereotyping, 
including making deliberate efforts to dismantle gender stereotypes and ensuring that a 
strong theory of gender equity drives such schools. Such efforts could include statewide 
guidance that provides local districts with information on issues of gender bias and financial 
assistance for professional development regarding gender equity. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 
100, at 6, 73-76; see Sax, supra note 22, at 48 (noting that "[p)rofessional development appears 
to play a crucial role" in the success of single-sex education). 
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sex schools, the school district should be required to demonstrate 
that involuntary attendance or the exclusion of one sex is necessary 
to achieve its objective, as the Court required the state to show 
in Virginia and Hogan. 384 To make this showing, the school 
district must demonstrate that the sex-neutral alternative of a 
coeducational school, including a coeducational school that requires 
some modification of its program, will not achieve the state's 
objective. 385 If a coeducational school is equally effective at achieving 
the objective, then the school district should be required to achieve 
its objective in a coeducational school. Like dual, voluntary schools, 
a solitary or involuntary school should also be examined to ensure 
that it does not perpetuate stereotypes. 
In addition, if the school district provides a solitary school, the 
district should also be required to establish an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for its denial of a single-sex school to one sex. 
Scholars and others have offered several reasons that they contend 
should be sufficiently persuasive to justify a district's decision to 
deny one sex a single-sex school, including inadequate demand.386 
For example, Justice Scalia noted in Virginia that the district court 
had found that a VMI-type program in Virginia for women would 
attract an insufficient number ofparticipants.387 
However, lack of demand should not serve as an exceedingly 
persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one sex for 
several reasons. Demand does not exist in a vacuum; instead, 
opportunity and circumstances shape demand. For instance, 
demand cannot be accurately assessed for a single-sex school that 
has never been provided to the excluded sex, while the school 
district or others have undertaken extensive recruitment efforts for 
the included sex.388 Disparities in interest under these circum 
384. See supra Part II.A (discussing the requirements of Virginia and Hogan). 
385. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 203, at 883 (arguing that after Virginia, "courts 
faced with gender equal protection challenges will need to consider whether institutions can 
make changes, even in practices not intentionally discriminatory, before ruling that the 
exclusion of one or the other gender is permissible"). 
386. See Hurd, supra note 266, at 35; Kimberly M. Schuld, Rethinking Educational Equity: 
Sometimes, Different Can Be an Acceptable Substitute for Equal, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461, 
485-88. 
387. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 578 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
388. At the elementary and secondary school levels, the Young Women's Leadership 
Foundation, which founded YWLS, "is stimulating interest and supporting local efforts to 
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stances may reflect the stimulation of interest in one sex. School 
districts that maintain a single-sex school for only one sex may also 
influence demand by discouraging the excluded sex from attending 
such schools and directing them elsewhere. 389 Thus, any alleged lack 
of demand among one sex should be examined very carefully to 
ensure that it is not simply the result of the past denial of opportu-
nity or of the school district or community members discouraging 
demand among the excluded sex. Also, demand may increase as 
single-sex opportunities are created, and thus, measuring the 
demand of either sex before a single-sex school is offered may 
generate inaccurate data.390 
Finally, the Court should adopt an approach to assessing the 
validity of the lack of demand argument for single-sex schools that 
is similar to its approach to such an argument in its race jurispru-
dence. The Court rejected an argument that insufficient demand 
among African Americans for a law school justified Missouri's denial 
of such a school to the petitioner in the 1938 decision of Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada.391 Similarly, the Court should also reject a 
lack of demand argument as an exceedingly persuasive justification 
establish a national network of exemplary public girls' schools in other large cities." 
SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 18. The first offspring, the Chicago Young Women's Leadership 
School, opened in 2000 and is a charter school for middle and high school girls that was 
designed by prominent female corporate leaders and attorneys. See id. The foundation has 
opened five single-sex public schools for girls and one for boys. Barak, supra note 1, at 33. The 
absence of boys' schools in Chicago does not mean that boys and their parents do not have an 
interest in single-sex education in that city. Instead, it may merely reflect the foundation's 
focus on girls in that city. 
389. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 32,34-35 (describing how officials at Western High 
School in Baltimore, Maryland, and Philadelphia High School for Girls have directed 
interested boys to other schools). 
390. See, e.g., SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 21 (stating that in New York, the demand to 
attend the YWLS has "grown exponentially. For the 2002-3 year there were more than 550 
applications for the 60 openings in the seventh grade and a waiting list of 1,200 for 3 ninth-
grade slots."); Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 809 ("[T)he interest in single-sex education 
continues to be high, especially within working-class, poor, and minority communities."); 
Caplice, supra note 99, at 285 (arguing that "it could well be that there is substantial latent 
demand for single-sex schools currently hidden by the unavailability of affordable single-sex 
schools to serve that demand"); Morgan, supra note 1, at 389 (noting a recent "resurgence of 
interest in single-sex schooling"). 
391. 305 u.s. 337, 350-51 (1938). 
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for the denial of a single-sex school to one sex once a school district 
provides that opportunity to the other sex.392 
In addition to rejecting lack of demand as a sufficient justification 
for denying a single-sex school to one sex, some contend that 
providing a single-sex school to one sex and the same benefits in a 
coeducational school to the other sex should satisfy a school dis-
trict's equal protection obligations.393 For example, when school 
board officials opened YWLS, they alleged that offering compara-
ble science, math enrichment, and leadership programs in a 
coeducational setting would ensure the school's constitutionality. 394 
Others contend that a single-sex school for one sex increases the 
options available for that sex without limiting the coeducational 
options of the other sex. 395 
On this question, the Court should also follow a course consistent 
with past precedent on a statutory sex discrimination claim, which 
held that the nondiscriminatory provision of some benefits does not 
cure the discriminatory denial of other benefits.396 Likewise, the 
denial of a single-sex school to one sex should not be upheld solely 
on the basis that the same educational programs and opportunities 
provided in the single-sex school are provided in a coeducational 
school. 397 The school's single-sex nature typically would benefit some 
students of the excluded sex,398 and thus, this denial should not be 
permitted without an exceedingly persuasive justification for why 
a single-sex school is not provided to the excluded sex. 
ffitimately, a solitary single-sex public school should only be 
permitted under limited circumstances for two reasons. First, equal 
392. See Brake, supra note 257, at 21. 
393. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 237 ("As long as the program has academic merit, 
does not promote sex stereotypes or rely on 'overbroad generalizations' concerning the abilities 
or preferences of girls or boys, and does not offer a 'unique' or 'extraordinary' opportunity that 
is not available to the other sex in a 'substantially equal' setting, then it will pass 
constitutional muster."). 
394. See id. at 15. 
395. Morgan, supra note 1, at 419. 
396. Ariz. GoverningComm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074, 1081 n.10 (1983) (holding that 
an employer program that provided lower payments to women violated Title VII and stating 
that "[a]n employer that offers one fringe benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape 
liability because he also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis" (citing Miss. Univ. 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 n.8 (1982))). 
397. See Pinzler, supra note 81, at 799. 
398. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text. 
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protection of the laws is determined by what the state initially 
chooses to provide-that is, the decision maker may either choose 
not to provide particular benefits or to provide equal benefits to 
those who are similarly situated. However, once the initial decision 
is made to provide the benefits, the decision maker cannot deny 
what it provides to one on the basis of a specific trait, without 
sufficient justification. 399 
Second, girls and boys are more similar in elementary and 
secondary education than they are different. This is evident in the 
fact that "[a]nalyses of thousands of studies have found that 
gender differences in cognitive and affective areas are actually 
quite small."400 In fact, when one considers boys and girls as 
separate groups, the differences within each of these groups "are 
much, much larger than differences between girls as a group and 
boys as a group."401 The data summarized in Part LA reveals that 
girls' and boys' educational performances are similar and that the 
gaps between them are closing in many areas.402 In addition, 
research also indicates that "[t]here are many boys who learn better 
in the cooperative, relational styles commonly associated with girls, 
and many girls who learn better in the competitive and individualis-
tic style often associated with boys. "403 In light of strong evidence 
that girls and boys are typically similarly situated in elementary 
and secondary education, different treatment should be the 
exception, rather than the norm. 
399. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (invalidating a statute that 
treated similarly situated men and women differently); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) 
("By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the 
challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
211, at 635 ("Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a 
similar manner."); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B. U. L. Rev. 693, 
710-11, 714 (2000). 
400. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36 (emphasis added); see also Campbell & 
Wahl, supra note 159, at 306-07 ("In fact, however, girls and boys are more similar than they 
are different. Researchers have known for many years that the differences among individual 
boys and among individual girls are far greater than any average differences between girls 
and boys." (footnote omitted)). 
401. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36 (emphasis added); see BARNETT & RIVERS, 
supra note 353, at 222 ("Boys often differ more from one another in their temperaments and 
styles of play, than they do from girls."). 
402. See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text. 
403. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 37 (citation omitted). 
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This leads to the important question of when a school district 
should be permitted to provide a solitary single-sex school. This 
Article proposes that if a district can establish that persuasive 
educational research shows that the sex excluded from a single-sex 
school would not benefit from the educational opportunities in a 
single-sex setting, the district would have established an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one 
sex.404 Such research could include consistent evidence, rather than 
a single study, that a single-sex environment disadvantages one 
sex, as some have contended is the case for boys.405 However, the 
district should still be required to provide the excluded sex those 
educational opportunities beyond the single-sex setting that are 
provided to the included sex. This would limit the denial of benefits 
to the opportunity to receive these benefits in a single-sex setting, 
rather than the totality of the benefits. 
Such a narrow avenue for different single-sex opportunities is 
consistent with the Court's opinion in Virginia, which implicitly 
suggested that when an educational opportunity is "inherently 
unsuitable" for one sex406-that is, that sex would not benefit from 
the opportunity-a persuasive case might be made for denying such 
an opportunity. As the number of single-sex schools continues to 
grow in the United States, ongoing experience in single-sex schools 
may develop a body of research that suggests that single-sex schools 
that focus on a particular subject area or methodology do not benefit 
one sex. If such research develops in the future, school districts 
should not be forced to provide a particular type of single-sex school 
to a sex that would not benefit from that specialized school. In the 
interim, if the existing solitary schools have not developed such 
research, they lack a sufficient justification for denying a substan-
tially equal single-sex school to the excluded sex. 
Finally, in addition to having a possible justification based on 
research demonstrating that one sex will not benefit from the 
single-sex opportunities, a school district that seeks to remedy past 
404. Cf Cerven, supra note 203, at 726 (arguing that some single-sex schools for girls "do 
not present evidence that boys would not similarly benefit from a school of their own with 
small classes and individualized attention" and that "failing to offer boys the benefit of this 
unique educational format appears to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
405. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. 
406. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996). 
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or present discrimination against one sex would have a sufficient 
justification for denying a single-sex school to one sex.407 Thus, 
single-sex schools for girls typically enjoy a potential justification 
that single-sex schools for boys do not-that is, those who operate 
such schools should be permitted to demonstrate that this country's 
history of sex discrimination against women and girls adversely 
affects the classroom experience of girls in schools today. However, 
educators should be required to identify within their district 
sufficient probative evidence of the discrimination that they seek to 
rectify, rather than assuming that past discrimination is influencing 
their classrooms. 408 Furthermore, to rely on this justification, 
educators must also demonstrate that this remedial justification 
actually motivated them either in starting the school or in maintain-
ing the school as a single-sex school.409 
4. Different Levels of Deference to the Judgments of Educators 
Should Be Applied to Each Category of Single-Sex Schools 
When applying these modifications to the substantial relationship 
test to dual, voluntary schools and to solitary or involuntary schools, 
a court must decide when it should defer to educational judgments 
regarding single-sex schools. Several scholars have argued that 
courts should defer to the decisions oflocal educators to offer single-
sex schools, and thus, generally should not interfere with efforts to 
provide such opportunities.410 The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national 
tradition."411 To uphold this autonomy, the Court often defers to the 
judgments of educators because educators are better equipped to 
make educational decisions than federal judges, who typically lack 
the expertise to make such decisions. 412 
407. See Corcoran, supra note 114, at 1032. 
408. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n ofS. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 910-
11 (11th Cir. 1997). 
409. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
410. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 832, 848-49; Morgan, supra note 1, at 423; Kolb, 
supra note 206, at 398-400. 
411. Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); see Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) ("States and local school boards are generally afforded considerable 
discretion in operating public schools."). 
412. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985). 
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Although deference to the judgments of educators may be 
appropriate in some circumstances, the Supreme Court's opinions 
lack adequate guidance for equal protection cases regarding when 
it should defer to the judgments of educators and when it should 
reject them. For example, the Court in Virginia, in no uncertain 
terms, chastised the Fourth Circuit for reviewing the VWIL plan 
under a deferential analysis by stating that "[t]he Fourth Circuit 
plainly erred in exposing Virginia's VWIL plan to a deferential 
analysis, for all 'gender-based classifications today' warrant 
'heightened scrutiny.'"413 The Court was also critical of the district 
court's reliance on "'findings' on 'gender-based developmental 
differences'" that "restate the opinions of Virginia's expert wit-
nesses, opinions about typically male or typically female 'tenden-
cies.'"414 The Court rejected these findings, noting that it had 
previously cautioned lower courts to examine statements closely 
regarding the tendencies of women and men, such as those proffered 
by Virginia and accepted by the district court.415 The Court's 
unequivocal rejection of these findings reveals that deference to 
educational judgments may not always be consistent with protecting 
the equal protection rights of those who may not fall within the 
typical paradigm for their sex, but who nevertheless must receive 
the same protection of their right to be treated as an individual. 
The strong rebuke of the Fourth Circuit in Virginia and the lack 
of deference to VMI's judgments stands in sharp contrast to the 
deference the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger gave to the University of 
Michigan Law School's "educational judgment that ... diversity is 
essential to its educational mission."416 The Court applied strict 
scrutiny in Grutter,417 an even more demanding standard than 
intermediate scrutiny; nevertheless, the Court deferred to the law 
school's judgment and explained that deference is consistent with its 
practice of deferring to the academic decisions of university officials, 
413. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (emphasis added). 
414. Id. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434-45 (W.D. Va. 
1991)). 
415. See id. 
416. 539 u.s. 306, 328 (2003). 
417. Id. at 326-27. 
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as long as those decisions are consistent with constitutional 
guarantees. 418 
Both the Virginia and Grutter decisions evaluate educational 
judgments of university officials, which traditionally have "a special 
niche in our constitutional tradition" because of the important goals 
of public education and the extensive rights to freedom of speech 
and thought at the postsecondary level.419 However, the Court's 
deference to educational judgments has also extended to the 
elementary and secondary level.420 Other courts reviewing such 
decisions will likely remain confused about when it is appropriate 
to defer to the judgments of educators under the Equal Protection 
Clause, as the Court did in Grutter v. Bollinger, and when to reject 
educational judgments, as the Court did in Virginia. Surely, the 
deference cannot tum on whether an individual's constitutional 
rights were violated, because the degree of deference will often be 
determinative of that question. 
A comprehensive development of how courts have and should 
determine when deference to educational judgments is appropriate 
is beyond the scope of this Article.421 In applying this Article's 
proposal, the degree of deference should vary according to the 
structure of the single-sex schools. Considerable deference should be 
given to the decision of a school district to offer dual, voluntary 
single-sex schools because these schools are less likely to harm 
either sex, and the structure of such schools achieves some of the 
work of intermediate scrutiny. Deference is also appropriate in such 
circumstances because single-sex education has received continuing 
support as an appropriate pedagogical approach,422 and the school 
district is not requiring that any child be classified on the basis of 
sex. Instead, the student or parent volunteers to be classified based 
418. See id. at 328. 
419. Id. at 329. 
420. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985). 
421. For possible approaches, see Ryan, supra note 325, at 1426, which contends that the 
Supreme Court's approach to determining when courts should defer to school officials requires 
a court "to identify the core, universal function of schools, and to use this function as a guide 
to determine the circumstances in which schools will be granted deference," and Anne P. 
Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393, 
471-72 (1998), which proposes a model for an appropriate level of judicial deference for 
educational decisions. 
422. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text. 
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on the student's sex. The opportunity to attend substantially equal 
single-sex schools on a voluntary basis provides greater assurance 
that the "school district has demonstrated its commitment to a 
course of action that gives full respect to the equal protection 
guarantees of the Constitution. "423 Therefore, judicial deference to 
such decisions will provide adequate flexibility for beneficial 
educational programs, while still providing sufficient oversight to 
uncover harmful stereotyping. 
In contrast, less deference should be given to educational 
judgments when the school district denies one sex the opportunity 
to attend a single-sex school or when attendance at a single-sex 
school is involuntary. Deference is less appropriate for solitary 
schools because the denial of a benefit to one sex is more likely to be 
based on the types of overly broad generalizations that the Court 
has found unconstitutional in other sex discrimination cases.424 
Similarly, an involuntary sex classification runs a higher risk that 
the classification will not serve its purpose in some instances than 
a voluntary classification that may be avoided by the student or 
parents. Therefore, less deference for involuntary single-sex schools 
is appropriate. 
In conclusion, Part V explores how adopting this proposed 
modification to intermediate scrutiny will result in optimal results 
for single-sex public schools. 
V. MODIFYING AND SYSTEMATIZING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO 
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL RESULTS FOR PuBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY 
AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools currently 
exist in over one-third of the states.425 Increased flexibility at the 
federal level for single-sex public schools and the growing interest 
in single-sex education create conditions in which single~sex public 
schools will increasingly become more common in the United 
423. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,490 (1992). 
424. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
425. See Minow, supra note 1, at 818. A tally of the states with single-sex schools listed on 
the NASSPE website indicates that eighteen states have single-sex public schools. See 
NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. 
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States.426 In light ofthe growing number of single-sex schools, it is 
important for educators and the Supreme Court to have clear and 
consistent constitutional standards with which to evaluate these 
schools.427 
Clear standards are presently lacking because the Court's 
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence is subject to a variety of 
disparate interpretations that could be interpreted too restrictively 
or too permissively to ensure the best possible results for single-sex 
public schools.428 A very restrictive interpretation would stifle the 
development of single-sex schools, while a permissive standard 
could allow educators to favor the needs of one sex over the other. 
Scholars have also not provided effective proposals that would 
ensure that school districts appropriately address the educational 
needs of both sexes, while ending the confusion in the Supreme 
Court's case law. 
This Article's proposal seeks to address these concerns by 
modifying and systematizing intermediate scrutiny when applied to 
single-sex public schools, thereby providing clear guidance on the 
constitutional obligations of these schools.429 By systematizing 
intermediate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools, its 
current indeterminacy is minimized. The increased consistency is 
desirable because, as Cass Sunstein perceptively observes, "[t]he 
Chancellor's foot is not a promising basis for antidiscrimination 
law. "430 The proposal's clarity and consistency should place interme-
diate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools within 
clear parameters that are more characteristic of the rule of law. As 
a result, courts are more likely to reach similar conclusions in 
426. See Minow, supra note 1, at 830-31; Michael A. Fletcher, Single·Sex Education Gets 
Boost, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at Al. 
427. See Minow, supra note 1, at 816 ("The topic of some urgency is single·sex education 
in kindergarten through high school .... For we are in the midst of a not-so-explicit policy shift: 
now is the time to raise attention and honestly assess it."). 
428. See supra 243-59 and accompanying text. 
429. See Brake, supra note 257, at 14 (arguing that "we need a constitutional standard that 
is clear for the lower courts"). 
430. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 78; see NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834 (arguing 
that intermediate scrutiny is no more than "ad hoc judgments based upon Justices' 
perceptions of the gender classification at issue in each case"); Deutsch, supra note 175, at 188 
(arguing that the results in intermediate scrutiny cases "turn on how the Court and the 
individual Justices view the underlying facts and policies, rather than on the verbalization 
of the standard of review"). 
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assessing such schools, thereby preventing the variation of equal 
protection rights from school district to school district and from 
state to state. 
In contrast to other proposals, this Article's proposal recognizes 
that the structure of single-sex schools affects the need for judicial 
skepticism of single-sex schools. ·More skepticism and a higher 
constitutional hurdle are appropriate when a school district provides 
a solitary or involuntary school because such schools increase the 
risk ofharm to students. The proposed modifications thereby ensure 
that the greatest scrutiny is applied when a school district is more 
likely to be denying the equal protection rights of schoolchildren by 
treating girls and boys differently or by forcing an individual to be 
classified on the basis of sex. In contrast, when a school district 
provides dual, voluntary schools, schoolchildren who want to avoid 
the sex classification have the option to do so. In modifying the level 
of judicial skepticism based on the structure of single-sex schools, 
this Article's proposal achieves some of the same benefits of the 
Court's three-tiered approach to equal protection that tries "to 
ensure that courts are most skeptical in cases in which it is highly 
predictable that illegitimate motives are at work."431 
By also requiring districts to examine how they structure single-
sex schools, the proposal ensures that a school district will develop 
such schools based on evidence about the current educational 
problems, needs, and barriers that educators are attempting to 
address, and about how educators can best address those needs 
through single-sex schools.432 Under the proposal, districts that 
consider offering single-sex schools must examine whether both 
sexes will benefit from single-sex schools and must establish an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for not offering substantially 
equal single-sex schools to both sexes. This ensures that the 
constitutional requirements for such schools do not permit dispa-
rate treatment of girls and boys, absent a persuasive justification 
for that treatment because girls and boys are typically similarly 
situated with respect to educational matters. Currently, a substan-
431. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 78. 
432. See Wexler, supra note 247, at 334 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny forces 
legislators to examine the justifications for adopting a certain justification and to consider 
whether and how well the proposed solution will work). 
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tial percentage of the single-sex schools do not provide similar 
opportunities to both sexes;433 however, whether these districts have 
a sufficiently persuasive reason for denying a single-sex school to 
only one sex remains to be seen. · 
Adoption of this proposal by the courts would put educators on 
notice that a solitary or involuntary single-sex school must have a 
much tighter nexus between the ends and means adopted, and be 
more effective than other sex-neutral alternatives. On the other 
hand, the more permissive interpretation of intermediate scrutiny's 
substantial relationship test for dual, voluntary schools allows 
educators to develop substantially equal single-sex schools for both 
sexes with less fear of such schools being found unconstitutional. 
When assessing the constitutionality of dual, voluntary schools, the 
proposal in this Article also avoids applying an unnecessarily heavy 
presumption in favor of coeducational schools, in light of evidence 
that coeducation does not necessarily prevent the subjugation of 
either sex. 434 
This Article's proposal is designed to minimize any obstacles to its 
adoption by the Supreme Court by drawing on existing Supreme 
Court jurisprudence when appropriate. Thus, it builds on the 
Court's recent modification of its equal protection jurisprudence in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, which implicitly recognized the appropriateness 
of modifying a constitutional standard when the classification under 
review demands a deviation from past standards to reach optimal 
results. When appropriate, the proposal is also consistent with 
United States v. Virginia, while recognizing that "Virginia left 
important questions unanswered. "435 For example, the Court noted 
in Virginia that "[s]everal amici [had] urged that diversity in 
educational opportunities is an altogether appropriate governmental 
pursuit and that single-sex schools can contribute importantly to 
such diversity. "436 The Court responded that it does "not question the 
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse 
educational opportunities. "437 The later statement may indicate that 
433. See supra notes 121, 133 and accompanying text. 
434. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text. 
435. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 458. 
436. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,534 n.7 (1996). 
437. ld. (emphasis added). 
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the Court will view the separate distribution of substantially equal 
educational benefits in single-sex schools for both boys and girls 
with much less skepticism than it viewed Virginia's denial of 
educational opportunities to females. 
In contrast, the Court's demanding interpretation of the interme-
diate scrutiny test in Virginia also reveals that the Court will look 
with tremendous skepticism upon disparities in single-sex educa-
tional opportunities, and that the same skepticism and demanding 
interpretation of the substantial relationship test present in 
Virginia will and should be required in a case in which a single-sex 
school is denied to only one sex.438 A school district's provision of a 
single-sex school to address an educational need would not be 
substantially related to addressing that need if it failed to meet the 
needs of students of the other sex who are similarly situated-that 
is, if their needs also would be met in a single-sex school. 439 
However, this Article's proposal would not apply this demanding 
interpretation of the substantial relationship test to all single-sex 
public schools because that would undoubtedly deter educators from 
opening such schools. 
This Article's proposal also seeks to strike the proper allocation 
of constitutional responsibility between educators, who have the 
greatest expertise in making educational judgments, and judges, 
who have more expertise in determining when disparate treatment 
is unwarranted. By allowing greater constitutional latitude for dual, 
voluntary single-sex schools, the proposal recognizes that courts 
may lack sufficient competence to second guess the judgment of 
educators that such educational opportunities are beneficial and 
thus, the courts will share with educators and families the responsi-
bility for protecting the constitutional rights of schoolchildren. 440 In 
438. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46. 
439. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) ("Congress may not legislate 'one step 
at a time' when that step is drawn along the line of gender, and the consequence is to exclude 
one group of families altogether from badly needed subsistence benefits."). 
440. By encouraging educators and courts to share responsibility for protecting the rights 
of schoolchildren, the proposal in this Article incorporates the wisdom of Richard Fallon who 
argued that 
the Court must assess the competence of courts to conduct particular kinds of 
inquiries; the costs that particular tests are likely to engender . .. ; and the 
political fairness of having courts resolve different kinds of questions on more 
or less deferential bases in the face of reasonable disagreements among the 
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contrast, when a school district provides an involuntary or solitary 
single-sex school, the application of a demanding standard focuses 
the courts' attention on the likelihood that educators may not be 
treating similarly situated students in a similar manner. The 
application of the more demanding standard does not prohibit all 
efforts to provide distinct educational opportunities to boys and 
girls; instead, it merely requires educators to provide exceedingly 
persuasive justifications for why they are not providing similar 
single-sex opportunities for boys and girls who are similarly 
situated. 44J While judiciaries lack the educational expertise to 
overrule the judgment of some educators that single-sex schools 
benefit students, courts can and should closely scrutinize cases in 
which school districts offer disparate opportunities to similarly 
situated girls and boys. 
Ultimately, the foundation for this Article's proposal rests on 
several principles regarding the nature of equal protection. It 
embraces the theory that govemment should have greater latitude 
to permit citizens to recognize their sex-when they believe that it 
may benefit them-than govemment should have to deny citizens 
benefits or opportunities on the basis of sex or to classify citizens on 
an involuntary basis.442 In addition, neither courts nor educators 
should casually stray from the bedrock principle that the govem-
citizenry .... 
When judicial competence is lacking or the costs of particular forms of judicial 
involvement would be great, the Court does not necessarily betray its obligation 
of constitutional fidelity if it fails to craft judicially enforceable rules that fully 
protect constitutional norms. The Court can share responsibility for 
implementing the Constitution with other institutions. Conversely, when 
judicial enforcement seems practically necessary, and a bright-line prophylactic 
rule will work most effectively at relatively low cost, not every doctrine that 
"over-enforces" constitutional norms reflects a constitutional betrayal. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 66 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
441. See supra notes 386, 399-406 and accompanying text. 
442. Martha Minow has observed that "[e)specially when used by decisionmakers who 
award benefits and distribute burdens, traits of difference can carry meanings uncontrolled 
and unwelcomed by those to who they are assigned. Yet denying those differences undermines 
the value they may have to those who cherish them as part of their own identity." Martha 
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 
10, 12 (1987). 
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ment must treat citizens as equals,443 even as society tries to remedy 
those instances in which equality has been historically denied. At 
bottom, the proposal wisely fears any potential danger from offering 
similar, voluntary opportunities for single-sex schools for girls and 
boys far less than it fears disparate or involuntary single-sex 
opportunities.444 Society is collectively harmed when a girl or a boy 
is denied an opportunity from which she or he would benefit simply 
because of her or his sex. "[I]nequalities prevent people from 
developing their potentials and hence deprive society of innumera-
ble benefits."445 Greater constitutional latitude for equal treatment 
recognizes that "the entire society is affected by the educational 
opportunities and achievements of each new generation, and that no 
one can be wasted. oo446 
Undoubtedly, no approach to determining the constitutionality of 
single-sex public schools will achieve perfect outcomes. This Article's 
approach is no exception because it will prohibit some single-sex 
public schools that would benefit some students. However, on 
balance, the approach achieves superior results compared to the 
two principal scholarly approaches and the variety of disparate 
approaches that can be drawn from the Supreme Court's current 
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence. The proposal also raises some 
questions of its own, such as whether the modifications could be 
applied to other sex classifications. Those questions do not under-
mine the fact that the proposed modifications are a substantial step 
toward clarifying a vague and indeterminate standard. 
By allowing some room within the Constitution's confines for 
single-sex schools, this Article agrees with those who contend that 
what was once used to subjugate women may be used to empower 
them.447 This country's history of sex discrimination, including the 
operation of single-sex and coeducational schools that focused on 
443. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1437-38 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires the government to treat similarly those who are similarly situated and to 
acknowledge relevant distinctions when persons are differently situated). 
444. Erwin Chemerinsky has observed that "human experience strongly suggests that the 
danger of erroneous discrimination incomparably exceeds the danger of erroneous uniformity." 
Chemerinsky, supra note 261, at 590. 
445. Id. at 587. 
446. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 282 (1999). 
447. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 459. 
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preparing girls for marriage, motherhood, or poorly paid positions, 
should not prevent the citizenry or a state actor from acknowledging 
sex when that acknowledgment may enable individuals to achieve 
their full potential.448 While some argue that single-sex schools for 
girls will always be inferior, some of the newest single-sex schools 
for girls have achieved remarkable results in urban areas where 
educators have struggled for years to improve outcomes.449 When 
these schools increase the graduation rates for girls, improve 
their academic performance, and focus their attention on their 
professional goals, rather than their popularity with boys, these 
schools can empower, rather than subjugate, girls and women. The 
shackles of the country's history with single-sex schools should not 
limit the opportunities for those girls or boys who would benefit 
from single-sex education today.450 The modifications proposed in 
this Article permit educators to develop single-sex schools among 
the array of public school choice reforms, while maintaining a 
commitment to equality.451 
The country should neither water down constitutional obligations 
in the name of improving educational outcomes, nor erect an 
impenetrable barrier in the way of efforts to improve educational 
achievement. Equal protection seeks to ensure that the government 
"treat[s] each individual with equal regard as a person,""52 which 
requires the government to treat similarly those who are similarly 
situated and to acknowledge relevant distinctions when persons are 
differently situated. The proposal presented in this Article would 
provide the optimal protection for students' equal protection rights 
by focusing scrutiny on solitary or involuntary single-sex schools 
and limiting scrutiny of dual, voluntary single-sex schools. If 
educators develop public single-sex elementary and secondary 
schools, they should act with a clear understanding of their 
448. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) ("Sex classifications may 
be used ... to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."). 
449. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text. 
450. Cf Minow, supra note 446, at 288 ("What if school choice reforms afforded the occasion 
for building on the past while undertaking bold experiments. What if we recognized, as Audre 
Lorde put it, that '[w)e have the power those who came before us have given us, to move 
beyond the place where they were standing."' (alteration in original)). 
451. See id. at 280 (noting that some new reforms "could undermine equality goals unless 
there are direct efforts to maintain and enforce them"). 
452. TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1437-38. 
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constitutional obligations. This understanding should encourage 
educators to develop beneficial educational programs and prevent 
the country from straying from its commitment to equal educational 
opportunity as public single-sex elementary and secondary schools 
continue to open.453 
453. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5 (identifying four single-sex schools that may open 
in 2006). 
